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This article addresses a significant challenge to federal Indian law
currently emerging in the federal courts. In 2013, the Supreme Court
suggested that the Indian Child Welfare Act may be unconstitutional, and
litigation on that question is now pending in the Fifth Circuit. The theory
underlying the attack is that the statute distinguishes between Indians and
non-Indians and thus uses the suspect classification of race, triggering strict
scrutiny under the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause. If
the challenge to the Indian Child Welfare Act succeeds, the entirety of federal
Indian law, which makes hundreds or even thousands of distinctions based on
Indian descent, may be unconstitutional. This article defends the
constitutionality of federal Indian law with a novel argument grounded in
existing Supreme Court case law. Specifically, this article shows that the
congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, which the
Supreme Court has recognized for nearly a century and a half and which
inevitably requires Congress to make classifications involving Indians and
Indian tribes, compels the application of a rational-basis standard of review
to federal Indian law.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal Indian law faces a very serious challenge. Since 1790,
Congress has enacted hundreds of statutes concerning American Indians and
American Indian tribes. Critics increasingly argue that statutory distinctions
between Indians and non-Indians are unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. The heart of the challenge maintains that these
distinctions are based on race and are therefore subject to the strict-scrutiny
standard of review generally applicable to suspect classifications. In a 2013
decision, the Supreme Court signaled a willingness to consider that
argument,1 which may come to the Court soon by way of an attack on the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 19782 currently pending before the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.3 The stakes could not be higher. If successful, the equalprotection challenge has the potential to destroy federal Indian law.
The purpose of this article is to defend the constitutionality of the
distinctions that Congress draws between Indians and non-Indians. My
argument, although novel, is grounded in established Supreme Court case
1

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 656 (2013).
Pub. L. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963).
3
In Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 536, 546 (N.D. Tex. 2018), a federal district
court held portions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as made applicable to the federal
government by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although a panel of the
Fifth Circuit reversed, Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019), the case is now
under en banc review, 942 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2019).
2
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law. In brief, I show that for nearly a century and a half, the Supreme Court
has maintained that Congress has plenary power over Indians and Indian
tribes. That plenary power, I argue, compels the application of a rational-basis
standard of review, both by logic and by direct analogy to the Court’s
longstanding equal-protection analysis of federal immigration law, another
area where Congress has plenary power. Under the rational-basis standard of
review, the distinctions in federal law between Indians and non-Indians
satisfy the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause.
Beginning with the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, passed as the
new republic’s thirty-third public law,4 Congress has legislated repeatedly on
Indians and Indian tribes. Much of the legislation is collected in Title 25 of
the United States Code, entitled simply “Indians.”5 The executive branch, in
turn, has issued hundreds of regulations under this legislation.6 The statues
and the regulations are extensive; they cover almost every aspect of public
life and many aspects of private life for individual Indians and for Indian
tribes. The federal government’s expansive authority here is unique. Under a
line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions dating to 1886,7 Congress has “plenary
power” over Indians and Indian tribes—in effect, the power to regulate the
external relations of Indian tribes, the internal governance of Indian tribes,
the economic activity of Indian tribes, and the health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of Indians.8 The congressional plenary power even includes
the authority to recognize or to abolish tribal status and tribal sovereignty.
Federal statutory and regulatory law draws numerous distinctions
between Indians and non-Indians, between members and non-members of
recognized Indian tribes, and between such tribes and all other groups subject
to U.S. jurisdiction.9 Many of the distinctions include a preference for Indians
or Indian tribes such that Indians or Indian tribes are treated better than their
non-Indian or non-tribal counterparts. For example, the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act generally permits certain gaming enterprises under tribal
ownership, even if state law otherwise prohibits such enterprises under non-

4

Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, §§ 1–5, 1 Stat. 137, 137–138.
See generally 25 U.S.C. (containing 48 chapters of federal laws governing numerous
aspects of Indian life, from education and healthcare to grave protection).
6
See generally 25 C.F.R. (cataloguing hundreds of regulations, including nearly 300 relating
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs alone).
7
See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382–84 (1886) (establishing that Congress has
plenary power over Indian tribes).
8
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 37–45 (2016); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 5.02–5.03 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2017) [hereinafter COHEN’S
HANDBOOK].
9
There are currently 574 tribal nations recognized by the federal government. See NAT’L CONG.
OF AM. INDIANS, TRIBAL NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 11 (2020)
(noting that 574 sovereign tribal nations have a bilateral relationship with the U.S. government).
5
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tribal ownership.10 And many of the distinctions include a dispreference for
Indians or Indian tribes, such that Indians or Indian tribes are treated worse
than their non-Indian or non-tribal counterparts. For example, section 177 of
Title 25 prohibits any “Indian nation or tribe of Indians” from selling,
granting, leasing, or otherwise conveying any land or title or claim to land,
except “by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.”11
In other words, section 177 denies Indian tribes the free alienability of their
lands. Unlike other landowners in the United States, tribes may transfer their
lands only to or under the authority of the federal government.
The equal-protection problem, from the perspective of those who see
an equal-protection problem, is that the distinctions underlying these
preferences and dispreferences are based in whole or in part on race. For
example, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act extends its preference only to an
Indian tribe, and it defines “Indian tribe” as a “band, nation, or other
organized group or community of Indians” recognized as such by the federal
government.12 A few federal statutes apply without regard to membership in
a recognized tribe. Under the Indian Education Act of 1972,13 the federal
government provides educational assistance to any “Indian”—with the term
“Indian” defined to include a member of a tribe that has been terminated by
the federal government, a member of a tribe recognized by a state government
but not by the federal government, a first- or second-degree descendant of
any such member, and any other person “considered by the Secretary of the
Interior to be an Indian for any purpose.”14
Many Indian law statutes refer to race only indirectly. Because federal
Indian law generally concerns the relationship between the federal
government and the 574 recognized Indian tribes or between the federal
government and the members of those tribes, statutory preferences and
dispreferences often depend on tribal status or tribal membership. 15 The
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 16 for
example, defines the term “Indian” as “a person who is a member of an Indian
tribe.”17 And the Indian Child Welfare Act defines the term “Indian child” as
an unmarried individual under the age of eighteen who is “a member of an
Indian tribe” or who is both “eligible for membership in an Indian tribe” and
10

25 U.S.C. § 2710.
Id. § 177.
12
Id. § 2703(5).
13
Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 334 (current version at scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
14
20 U.S.C. § 7491(3).
15
Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian Nations,
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 437, 451–53 (2002).
16
Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5321–5332 and
42 U.S.C. §2004b).
17
25 U.S.C. § 5304(d).
11
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“the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” 18 Such references to
tribal membership are effectively references to the racial classification of
American Indians or Alaska Natives. Under a longstanding Supreme Court
decision, any Indian tribe recognized as such by Congress must be a
“distinctly Indian communit[y].”19 Although the precise parameters remain
vague, a federally recognized Indian tribe must comprise, to some substantial
extent, people who are racially Indian. 20 Thus, whether a federal statute
specifically refers to individuals of the Indian race or generally refers to
individuals who are members of Indian tribes, the statute very likely has the
effect of classifying individuals on the basis of race.21
That raises questions under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to the federal government through the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.22 Settled constitutional law
Id. § 1903(4). The Indian Child Welfare Act defines “Indian tribe” as a federally
recognized tribe. Id. § 1903(8).
19
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (emphasis added); see also Sarah
Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the Constitutional Minimum,
69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 533–35 (2017) (noting that Sandoval and related cases “affirm that
Congress's power to recognize tribes and pass legislation concerning them hinges on tribes' status
as distinct political communities with ties to precontact aboriginal peoples.”).
20
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 3.02(4). “[T]he only practical limitations on
congressional and executive decisions as to tribal existence are the broad requirements that:
(a) the group have some ancestors who lived in what is now the United States before
discovery by Europeans, and (b) the group be a ‘people distinct from others.’” Id. (quoting
The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755 (1867)). Additionally, tribes themselves
usually require some measure of Indian ancestry for tribal membership. Tribal Enrollment
Process, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/tribes/enrollment
[https://perma.cc/LY2B-7GFH] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). Those requirements typically
derive from historic federal mandates. Often, a member must be a lineal descendant of
someone on the tribe’s “base roll” (the tribe’s original membership list, typically compiled
under the authority of the federal government in the late nineteenth or early twentieth
century), and many tribes require a specific “blood quantum” or minimum percentage of
“Indian blood.” Tommy Miller, Beyond Blood Quantum: The Legal and Political
Implications of Expanding Tribal Enrollment, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 323, 323–25, 345–48
(2014); see also Bethany R. Berger, Race, Descent, and Tribal Citizenship, 4 CALIF. L. REV.
CIR. 23, 28–29 (2013) (identifying various tribes’ “blood quantum” thresholds for
membership); Goldberg, supra note 15, at 445–50 (noting explicit federal affirmation of
tribal voting eligibility provisions closely linked to citizenship); L. Scott Gould, Mixing
Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 718 (2001)
(“[R]ace is now an essential criterion for recognizing tribes, approving tribal governments,
and, among tribes themselves, in defining tribal membership.”).
21
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 14.03(b)(ii) (“[E]ven when federal
classifications turn solely on formal tribal citizenship, the fact that Indian ancestry is
normally required for citizenship as a matter of tribal law suggests that the federal
classification may be incorporating a race-like component.”); see also Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, Tribal Membership and Indian Nationhood, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 1 (2012) (“It
is impossible to avoid the fact that racial ancestry is critical to tribal membership criteria.”).
22
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
18
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holds that race is a suspect classification and that a legislative or regulatory
distinction made on the basis of race is subject to judicial review under a
strict-scrutiny standard. 23 This requires that the legislation or regulation be
“narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling governmental interest[].”24
Non-suspect legislative and regulatory classifications generally are reviewed
under a much more forgiving rational-basis standard, so that the legislation
or regulation is valid if it is “rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.”25 Although it is possible for a classification to survive strictscrutiny review, this is both difficult and rare. The principal race-based
classifications that have passed strict scrutiny have been affirmative-action
programs in higher education.26
For most of the last half century, the Supreme Court has treated
federal Indian law differently under the Equal Protection Clause. In Morton
v. Mancari, decided in 1974, the Court unanimously upheld an employment
preference for Indians at the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (the BIA)
against an equal-protection challenge, even though the preference looked in
part to Indian descent.27 In the Court’s view, the preference was “reasonably
designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA
more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups.”28 The Court said that,
as a general matter, any “special treatment” of Indians that “can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians
. . . will not be disturbed” and that, as a specific matter, because the BIA
employment preference was “reasonable and rationally designed to further
Indian self-government,” it did not violate the equal-protection requirement.29
In effect, Mancari subjects classifications of Indians and Indian tribes under
federal Indian law to a modified form of rational-basis review.
Even as general challenges to affirmative action have gained traction
in the federal courts, the Supreme Court has adhered to Mancari and has
upheld classifications involving Indians or Indian tribes, whether those
23

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
Id.
25
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973). Occasionally, rational-basis
review has “bite.” Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 759–
63 (2011). Legislative classifications on the basis of gender or illegitimacy, sometimes referred
to as “quasi-suspect,” trigger intermediate scrutiny. Such classifications “must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”
in order to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
26
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. See
generally George Rutherglen, Fisher II: Whose Burden, What Proof? 20 GREEN BAG 2D 19
(2016) (commenting on the Court’s finding in Fisher II that the University of Texas met its
burden under strict scrutiny).
27
417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
28
Id. at 554.
29
Id. at 555.
24
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classifications are favorable or unfavorable. Thus, in Fisher v. U.S. District
Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District of Montana, the Court relied on
Mancari to reject an equal-protection challenge to a tribal ordinance
subjecting an Indian, but not a similarly situated non-Indian, to tribal-court
jurisdiction for adoption proceedings;30 in Moe v. Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, the Court relied on Mancari to
reject an equal-protection challenge to the federal exemption of Indians from
state taxation;31 in Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, the Court
relied on Mancari to reject an equal-protection challenge to a distribution of
federal funds to the Cherokee Delawares and the Absentee Delawares but not
to the Kansas Delawares;32 in United States v. Antelope, the Court relied on
Mancari to reject an equal-protection challenge to a federal criminal statute
that exposed an Indian, but not a similarly situated non-Indian, to a felonymurder charge;33 in Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the
Yakima Indian Nation, the Court relied on Mancari to reject an equalprotection challenge to the State of Washington’s partial assumption of
criminal and civil jurisdiction for matters involving Indians or Indian tribes; 34
in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Association, the Court relied on Mancari to reject an equal-protection
challenge to treaty provisions reserving fishing rights to Indians.35
But cross winds have begun to blow. In its 1995 decision in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, the Supreme Court applied the strict-scrutiny
standard to a federal program that gave contracting preferences to firms
owned or controlled by “socially and economically disadvantaged” groups,
including “black, Hispanic, Asian Pacific, Subcontinent Asian, and Native
Americans.”36 Then, suggesting a possible interest in revisiting Mancari, the
Court in its 2013 decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl said that the
Indian-adoption preferences in the Indian Child Welfare Act might “raise
equal protection concerns.”37 Taking that cue, a federal district court, in
Brackeen v. Zinke, read Mancari narrowly and struck down core provisions

30

424 U.S. 382, 390–91 (1976).
425 U.S. 463, 479–81 (1976).
32
430 U.S. 73, 85–87 (1977). The Cherokee Delawares and the Absentee Delawares were
both federally recognized tribes; the Kansas Delawares were not. Id. at 85.
33
430 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1977).
34
439 U.S. 463, 500–01 (1979).
35
443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979).
36
515 U.S. 200, 207, 236 (1995).
37
570 U.S. 637, 656 (2013). For an argument that the Court should have examined the equal
protection question further in that case, see Christopher Deluzio, Tribes and Race: The Court’s
Missed Opportunity in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 34 PACE L. REV. 509, 510 (2014).
31
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of the Indian Child Welfare Act using the strict-scrutiny standard.38 Although
a panel of the Fifth Circuit followed a straightforward application of Mancari
to reverse the district court in Brackeen v. Bernhardt,39 the case is now pending
before the Fifth Circuit for en banc review.40 Whether through Brackeen or
some other vehicle, the prospect of the Supreme Court taking a hard look at the
equal-protection status of federal Indian law seems stronger now than at any
time since Mancari and the cases decided in its immediate wake.
From the perspective of Indians and Indian tribes, everything will turn
on that hard look. If subjected to strict scrutiny, most (possibly all) of federal
Indian law could be struck down. Again, every statute in Title 25 and every
regulation issued under Title 25 draws a distinction between Indians and nonIndians, between members and non-members of recognized Indian tribes, or
between such tribes and all other groups.41 And those distinctions normally
incorporate a direct or indirect reference to Indian descent. Federal Indian
law presents little difficulty under the modified rational-basis review of
Mancari. But if the Supreme Court replaces modified rational-basis review
with strict-scrutiny review, how many federal Indian statutes or regulations
would be found to be “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling
governmental interest”? 42 The threat is very grave.
This is the equal-protection challenge confronting federal Indian law.
How is the challenge best met? Scholars and advocates of tribal interests have
proposed a broad range of solutions and arguments, some more persuasive or
compelling than others.43 In this paper, I present a defense of the
constitutionality of federal Indian law, a defense that is novel but nonetheless
grounded in established Supreme Court case law. Specifically, I argue that,
for any equal-protection question under federal Indian law, the congressional
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, which has been recognized by
the Supreme Court since the late nineteenth century, precludes application of
the strict-scrutiny standard of review and compels application of the rational-

338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 532–34 (N.D. Tex. 2018), rev’d sub nom. Brackeen v. Bernhardt,
937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019), rehearing en banc granted, 942 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2019). The
district court’s decision in Brackeen quoted the Supreme Court’s equal-protection dicta from
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. See id. at 533 n.10 (noting that, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
“the Supreme Court mentioned that an interpretation of provisions of ICWA that prioritizes a
child’s Indian ancestry over all other interests ‘would raise equal protection concerns’”).
39
937 F.3d 406, 427–29 (5th Cir. 2019), rehearing en banc granted, 942 F.3d 287, 289 (5th
Cir. 2019).
40
Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 942 F.3d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2019).
41
See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
42
See, e.g., Ralph W. Johnson & E. Susan Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH.
L. REV. 587, 594 (1979) (“If the modern doctrine of strict scrutiny were to be applied to all
classifications based on ‘Indian-ness,’ the entire structure of Indian law would crumble.”).
43
See infra Part III.
38
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basis standard. This approach yields outcomes that are similar but not identical
to the results under Mancari, and it broadly validates federal Indian law.
In brief, my argument runs as follows. I take the congressional
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes as a given, although I recognize
that several scholars and at least one sitting member of the Supreme Court
express skepticism about it. As articulated time and again by the Supreme
Court, this power is comprehensive; it permits Congress to regulate both the
external and the internal affairs of Indians and Indian tribes, including the
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of Indians. Additionally, the
congressional plenary power is exclusive of state power; it is the federal
government, not state governments, that exercises this complete regulatory
authority over Indians and Indian tribes. Over the last century and a half, the
Court has established the congressional plenary power as a bedrock principle
of federal Indian law.
But Congress cannot exercise this power without drawing distinctions
between Indians and non-Indians, between members and non-members of
recognized Indian tribes, and between such tribes and all other groups. As a
matter of simple logic, the congressional plenary power cannot be reconciled
with strict-scrutiny review of federal statutes that directly or indirectly
incorporate Indian descent; only rational-basis review permits Congress to
exercise its plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes. This is precisely
how the Supreme Court treats a similar plenary power—the congressional
plenary power over immigration. Under longstanding Supreme Court
decisions, the exercise of the congressional plenary power over immigration
is reviewed, for equal-protection purposes, under the rational-basis standard.
Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that federal Indian law
statutes and regulations constitute a reasonable exercise of the congressional
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes. And for that reason, federal
Indian law generally satisfies the equal-protection requirement.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The first part sets
out the argument that the congressional plenary power over Indians and
Indian tribes compels application of the rational-basis standard and precludes
application of the strict-scrutiny standard. This is a matter both of logic and
consistency with the Supreme Court’s approach to immigration law. The
second part draws out the specific implications of this argument. It shows that
most (probably all) of federal Indian law, whether favorable or unfavorable
to Indians and Indian tribes, satisfies the equal-protection requirement under
the rational-basis standard. It also shows that state-law preferences and
dispreferences for Indians and Indian tribes remain subject to strict scrutiny
and so generally fail the equal-protection requirement, except when state law
implements a delegation of federal power. The third part assesses previous
scholarly efforts to address the equal-protection challenge.

10
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I. CONGRESSIONAL PLENARY POWER AND RATIONAL-BASIS REVIEW
The congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes,
although long settled in Supreme Court case law, remains controversial.
Several academics object to the plenary power on various doctrinal and
normative grounds. Justice Thomas has stated his interest in re-examining it,
and perhaps others on the Court harbor doubts as well. For purposes of this
article, I take the plenary power as a given. That is, I assume that Congress
has plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, and I assume that the
terms of that power are as described by the Supreme Court in a long line of
cases reaching back to the nineteenth century. I intend, in future work, to
analyze the foundations of the plenary power doctrine, but it is sufficient
here to explain the content of the doctrine and to assume that the Court’s
decisions under the doctrine are generally correct (at least as to their
holdings, if not as to their rationales). What must be shown are the
implications of the congressional plenary power for the application of the
equal-protection requirement to federal Indian law. That is the principal
work of this Part.
A. Congressional Plenary Power over Indians and Indian Tribes
The congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes is
unusual in our constitutional system. The federal government is a government
of limited powers, and Congress may legislate only when it has
constitutional authority to do so, 44 such as when it imposes taxes, pursuant
to its “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” or
when it creates lower federal courts, pursuant to its power “[t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”45 During the middle of the
twentieth century, the congressional power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States”46 developed into an expansive source of federal
lawmaking. Once it came around to validating New Deal legislation, the
Supreme Court determined that “[t]he [interstate] commerce power is not
confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the states” but
that it also “extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make

See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Every law enacted by
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are
defined, and limited . . . .”).
45
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
46
Id.
44

Vol. 6:1]

Equal Protection Challenge to Federal Indian Law

11

regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the
effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce.”47
Although broad, the congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce is not comprehensive. It does not enable Congress, for example,
to regulate the possession of firearms in school zones,48 to create a private
cause of action against perpetrators of certain violent acts, 49 or to require
individuals to purchase health insurance from private insurers.50 It does not
grant Congress the authority to exercise a general police power; 51 instead, it
allows Congress to regulate only the channels of interstate commerce, the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.52
The congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes is
qualitatively different. Although not absolute or unlimited, the plenary power
enables Congress to establish the terms on which the U.S. maintains
government-to-government relationships with the Indian tribes, including
whether to recognize tribes in the first instance.53 The plenary power permits
Congress to expand, limit, or even eliminate tribal sovereignty, and it permits
Congress to terminate the relationship between the federal government and an
Indian tribe, thereby cutting the tribe off from all the benefits and burdens of
federal recognition as an Indian tribe.54 And as a distinct source of legislative
authority, the plenary power is not subject to the limitations that the Supreme
Court has recognized or imposed under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Importantly, the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian
tribes includes a broad authorization to legislate as to the health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of Indians and Indian tribes in a manner “similar
to the states’ police powers over non-Indians.”55 This tracks the parallel
congressional power over U.S. “territories and possessions, the District of
Columbia, and federal enclaves such as post offices, national parks, and

47

United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942); see also NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (“It is a familiar principle that acts
which directly burden or obstruct interstate . . . commerce . . . are within the reach of the
congressional power.”).
48
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
49
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
50
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552 (2011).
51
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
52
Id. at 558–59.
53
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.02.
54
Id.
55
Id. The assertion of a general federal police power over Indians and Indian tribes is
controversial. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 245 (2002) (arguing that “there is no constitutionally
acceptable justification for claims of overriding federal power” with respect to Indian tribes).
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military installations.”56 Thus, Congress has the power to create and
administer comprehensive programs for Indian education,57 health care,58
housing,59 and other social services;60 to acquire, own, sell, and regulate the
use of tribal lands;61 to define and to punish crimes within Indian country, 62
including crimes that normally would be defined and punished by state
law;63 to control the exploitation of natural resources within Indian
country;64 to regulate foster care, adoptions, child custody, and child
welfare for Indians and Indian tribes; 65 to permit and to regulate gaming
activities by Indians and Indian tribes, even where such activities would be
prohibited under state law; 66 to regulate the transportation, sale, and other
distribution of alcohol to and within Indian country; 67 to control the devise
and descent of Indian property; 68 to protect and to promote Indian and tribal
cultural resources;69 and to safeguard Indian graves and Indian remains
from use or exploitation by non-Indians.70

COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.02 (footnotes omitted).
See id. § 5.03 (noting that Congress created and funds the Indian Health Service and
Bureau of Indian Affairs, which has broad authority over “social services, welfare, economic
development, education, and housing programs.”).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
“Indian country” is a term of art in federal Indian law, though federal Indian law does not
provide a comprehensive definition of it. For purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction,
“Indian country” is defined as
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b)
all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-ofway running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151. Thus, Indian country includes all lands within the boundaries of a
reservation, even lands that are owned in fee simple by non-Indians, and all lands outside the
boundaries of a reservation that are owned in fee simple by an Indian tribe or by members of
an Indian tribe. By common practice, the definition in the federal criminal code is used in
civil matters as well. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 3.04.
63
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 6.01.
64
Id. § 5.05.
65
Id. § 6.04.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. § 4.07.
69
Id. § 20.02.
70
Id. § 1.07.
56
57
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Several points bear emphasis here. First, as articulated by the
Supreme Court, the plenary power is not just a power over Indian tribes; it is
also a power over Indians as individuals.71 The Court has referred repeatedly
to the congressional “plenary power[] over . . . Indians”72 and the “plenary
power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians.” 73 Whether
the Court means for the power to reach beyond individual Indians who are
members of recognized Indian tribes is open to question,74 but it is clear that
the power is not limited to Indian tribes as collectives. Instead, it reaches into
the tribes and applies to individual tribal members.75
Second, the plenary power is not restricted to interstate commerce. 76
For that reason, Congress can regulate matters involving Indians or Indian
tribes that it cannot otherwise regulate. This point is foundational to the
capacity of Congress to use the plenary power as a general police power with
respect to Indians and Indian tribes. Congress can—and does—use its plenary
power to do for Indians and Indian tribes what state and local governments
often do for their citizens and residents, such as regulate land use, provide
rules for testate and intestate succession, implement public health and safety
measures, and control education at the primary and secondary levels. It may
well be, for example, that the plenary power would permit Congress to
regulate the possession of firearms in school zones within Indian country, 77
to create a private cause of action against perpetrators of certain violent acts
71

Cf. id. § 5.02 (describing Congress exercising authority over individual property in
addition to tribal property and property held in trust).
72
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 408 (1980); see also Bd. of
Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 354 (1939) (acknowledging Congress’s “exclusive
plenary power to legislate concerning . . . Indians . . . .”); United States v. Algoma Lumber
Corp., 305 U.S. 415, 421 (1939) (noting that “the government has plenary power to take
appropriate measures to safeguard the disposal of property of which the Indians are the
substantial owners.”).
73
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S.
193, 201 (2004) (noting that “entering into treaties with the Indian tribes” did not impact or
diminish Congress’s plenary power over Indians and tribes); Antoine v. Washington, 420
U.S. 194, 203–04 (1975) (“Article I, § 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with the power to ‘regulate
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes,’ and thus, to this extent, singles Indians out as a proper
subject for separate legislation.”) (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551–52).
74
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.01 n.38 (“The exercise of power under the Indian
commerce clause is limited to situations in which a tribe has a distinct political existence.
Laws directed at Indians as members of racial or ethnic minorities must be justified on
other grounds.”).
75
Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943,
968–73 (2002); Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal
Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 999–1000 (1981).
76
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.01 (“The Indian Commerce Clause . . . is not limited
to regulation of trade or economic activities, or laws that are interstate in character or impact.”).
77
Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked the
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
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against Indians,78 or to require individual Indians to purchase health
insurance from private insurers.79
Third, the plenary power has broad preemptive effect over state law.
For this reason, the power is not only plenary but also exclusive. 80 In
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Supreme Court said:
[O]ur inquiry is limited to determining whether the Indian
Commerce Clause, like the Interstate Commerce Clause, is a
grant of authority to the Federal Government at the expense of
the States. The answer to that question is obvious. If anything,
the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of
power from the States to the Federal Government than does the
Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from the fact
that the States still exercise some authority over interstate
trade but have been divested of virtually all authority over
Indian commerce and Indian tribes. 81
The inapplicability of state law within Indian country dates back to the 1832
opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia.82 In reversing the
state criminal conviction of a Congregationalist minister who lived and
worked among the Cherokees in violation of Georgia law, Marshall said that
the U.S. Constitution gives the federal government the exclusive power to
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes 83 and that, within Cherokee lands,
the “laws of Georgia can have no force.” 84
Although the Supreme Court has allowed some inroads for state
regulation of non-Indians within Indian country,85 it has “repeatedly affirmed

78

Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked the
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to create a private cause of action for violence
against women).
79
Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552 (2011) (holding that Congress
lacked the power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to enact the individual mandate of
the Affordable Care Act).
80
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.02.
81
517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996).
82
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 595 (1832).
83
Id. at 557–62.
84
Id. at 561.
85
See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186 (1989) (finding that
“federal law, even when given the most generous construction, does not pre-empt” New
Mexico from imposing oil and gas severance taxes on energy extractions from Indian
reservations); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
157 (1980) (holding, in part, that the Indian Commerce Clause does not “automatically bar[]
all state taxation of matters significantly touching the political and economic interests of the
Tribes,” especially when the taxes do not discriminate against or burden Indian commerce).
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. . . the Worcester decision.”86 Thus, “as a general rule, matters affecting Indians
in Indian country are excepted from the usual application of state law to the
ordinary affairs of state inhabitants.”87 Congressional regulation has preempted,
as applied to Indians and Indian tribes, “state hunting and fishing laws,
regulatory [and] tax laws, and laws governing such traditional state areas of
concern as child welfare.”88 Within limits, Congress can delegate its regulatory
power to the states.89 But unless it does so, it is Congress, not the states, that
holds and exercises the general police power over Indians and Indian tribes.
Fourth, the plenary power is subject to the general limitations on
congressional power imposed by the Bill of Rights. In the early twentieth
century, the Supreme Court took the view that challenges to the exercise of
the congressional plenary power were non-justiciable. In upholding
legislative abrogation of an Indian treaty, the Court said that, “as Congress
possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire
into the motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation” and that
“[i]f injury was occasioned . . . by the use made by Congress of its power,
relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress, and not to the
courts.”90 But that extreme deference to Congress in Indian matters has long
since given way to the view that the rights provisions of the Constitution
trump the plenary power.91 Thus, for example, federal takings of tribal lands
generally trigger the Fifth Amendment requirement to pay just

COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 6.01. As support, Cohen’s Handbook cites the
following: Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 159 (1982); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975);
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 168–69 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217, 218–19 (1959). See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 377 (1886) (affirming
federal, as opposed to state or tribal, jurisdiction over certain designated offenses “committed by
one Indian against the person or property of another . . . on an Indian reservation”); The New
York Indians, 72 U.S. 761, 771–72 (1867) (holding that the state of New York does not have the
power to tax Indian tribes); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 757, 759–60 (1867) (holding that
the state of Kansas does not have the power to tax Indian tribes). On the preemptive effect of the
congressional plenary power, see also Clinton, supra note 75, at 1006–08.
87
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 6.01.
88
Id. at § 5.02.
89
The preeminent example of such delegation is Public Law 280. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67
Stat. 588 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). Enacted in 1953, Public Law
280 delegates federal criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country to certain specific
states. See generally Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of
Lawlessness in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1997) (critiquing
Congress’s stated rationale for Public Law 280); Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The
Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975)
(exploring the legislative history of Public Law 280 and its effects on jurisdiction over
reservation Indians).
90
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).
91
Clinton, supra note 75, at 995–97.
86
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compensation.92 And federal statutes and regulations involving Indians or
Indian tribes are subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as applicable to the federal government through the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 93 But of course, to say that federal
Indian law is subject to the equal-protection requirement is not to say that
federal classifications involving Indians and Indian tribes are necessarily
subject to strict scrutiny under that requirement.
Fifth, as indicated above, the legitimacy of the plenary power remains
controversial. The difficulty here, which has grown more pressing as
textualism has gained greater prominence in the federal courts, is in locating
a basis for the plenary power in the Constitution. The two leading candidates,
at least in the view of the contemporary Supreme Court, are the Indian
Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause. 94 The Indian Commerce Clause,
located in Article I, grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . .
with the Indian Tribes.”95 The Court views “the central function” of the
Indian Commerce Clause as “provid[ing] Congress with plenary power to
legislate in the field of Indian affairs.” 96 The problem with relying on the
Indian Commerce Clause is apparent. The Court has held that the plenary
power authorizes congressional regulation even of the internal affairs of
Indian tribes and the private transactions of individual Indians. That requires
an expansive understanding of the word “Commerce”—an understanding far
more expansive than the Court has allowed for the same word in the Interstate
Commerce Clause. Even the case that first announced the congressional
92

Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 496 (1937). But see Tee-Hit-Ton Indians
v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 290 (1955) (declining “to subject the Government to an
obligation to pay the value” of property taken from the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians in Alaska).
93
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); see also Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks,
430 U.S. 73, 75 (1977) (holding that a group of Indians was not denied “equal protection of
the laws in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” when it was not
included in the distribution of an award from the Indian Claims Commission).
94
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); see also Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central function of the Indian Commerce Clause
is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”);
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551–52 (1974) (“[T]he plenary power of Congress to deal with the
special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution
itself. Article I, § 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with the power to ‘regulate Commerce . . . with
the Indian Tribes,’ and thus, to this extent, singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate
legislation. Article II, § 2, cl. 2, gives the President the power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties. This has often been the source of the Government's
power to deal with the Indian tribes.”); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S.
164, 172 n.7 (1973) (“The source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject
of some confusion, but it is now generally recognized that the power derives from federal
responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making.”).
95
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
96
Cotton Petroleum Corp., 490 U.S. at 192.
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plenary power, United States v. Kagama, specifically rejected the Indian
Commerce Clause as a basis for the power. 97 As long as this point remains
contested, the Indian Commerce Clause will continue to provide an insecure
footing for the plenary power.
The Treaty Clause, located in Article II, is an even more dubious basis
for the plenary power. It states that the president “shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.”98 The Supreme
Court concedes that the “treaty power does not literally authorize Congress
to act legislatively, for it is an Article II power authorizing the President, not
Congress, ‘to make Treaties.’”99 But the Court reasons that “treaties made
pursuant to that power can authorize Congress to deal with ‘matters’ with
which otherwise ‘Congress could not deal.’”100 This approach, however,
provides at best an incomplete and imperfect justification for the plenary
power. Congress ended the practice of making treaties in 1871; there have
been no treaties between the United States and any Indian Tribe in the last
150 years.101 The Treaty Clause, then, cannot justify exercise of the plenary
97

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The Court in Kagama considered the
constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act, which made certain crimes committed by Indians
within Indian Country federal offenses. The Court said the Indian Commerce Clause
is relied on in the argument in the present case, the proposition being that
the statute under consideration is a regulation of commerce with the Indian
tribes. But we think it would be a very strained construction of this clause,
that a system of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their
reservations, which left out the entire code of trade and intercourse laws
justly enacted under that provision, and established punishments for the
common-law crimes of murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, larceny,
and the like, without any reference to their relation to any kind of
commerce, was authorized by the grant of power to regulate commerce
with the Indian tribes.
Id. at 378–79. Although some commentators maintain that the Supreme Court first
announced the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes in Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), that case is really about federalism—specifically,
whether the state governments have authority over the Indian tribes. Worcester determined
that governmental authority over the Indian tribes resides in the federal government and tribal
governments. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 558–59. Kagama, decided a half century later,
determined that the federal government has plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes.
118 U.S. at 384–85.
98
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2.
99
Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2).
100
Id. (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)).
101
Section 1 of the Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871 provides that “hereafter no Indian
nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized
as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty.” Pub. L. 41-120, 16 Stat. 544 (1871). “The reason for the prohibition was the House’s
resentment of the Senate’s outsized role in setting Native American policy through its
exclusive power to ratify treaties.” Michael Doran, Legislative Entrenchment and Federal
Fiscal Policy, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 40 (2018).
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power over Indians and Indian tribes as to any tribe with which the United
States never entered a treaty (consisting, for the most part, of tribes in the
western part of the country and in Alaska) or as to any matter not covered in
any of the hundreds of treaties that the United States did make with the tribes.
On this approach, establishing the legitimacy of any specific exercise of the
plenary power would require a tribe-by-tribe, treaty-by-treaty, matter-bymatter analysis.
Thus, the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes,
although firmly established in Supreme Court case law, stands on a contested
and uncertain constitutional basis. The leading treatise on federal Indian law
confidently asserts, in reference to the Indian Commerce Clause and the
Treaty Clause, that “Congress’s power to give effect to these provisions,
coupled with the supremacy of federal law[,] provides ample support for the
federal regulation of Indian affairs.”102 But others are not so sure. Over the
last half century, scholars and commentators have questioned, criticized, or
even rejected the legitimacy of the plenary power. 103
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at § 5.01.
See, e.g., Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm within Public Law, 132
HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1829–38 (2019) (summarizing history of the Supreme Court’s
“dormant inherent powers doctrine”); M. Alexander Pearl, Originalism and Indians, 93 TUL.
L. REV. 269, 328 (2018) (criticizing textualist arguments in support of the plenary power for
using “cherry-picked” sources); Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause,
124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1082–88 (2015) (describing the original congressional authority as
restricted to only international treaties and land sales); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal
Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 73–94 (2012) (arguing that there is no textual basis to
establish absolute congressional power over Indian tribes); Robert G. Natelson, The Original
Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U.L. REV. 201, 212 (2007) (“The
drafting history of the Constitution, the document’s text and structure, and its ratification
history all show emphatically that the Indian Commerce Power was not intended to be
exclusive.”); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85
NEB. L. REV. 121, 132–33 (2006) (explaining that skepticism of the plenary power gained
prevalence due to the Rehnquist Court’s “deep suspicion” of congressional authority); Philip
P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV.
433, 443 n.58 (2005) (claiming that the plenary power “was never justified by reference to
constitutional text”); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1069, 1086–1105 (2004) (arguing that the Indian Commerce Clause does not textually
support a grant of plenary power over Indians to Congress); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of
Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25-27, 77–81 (2002) (asserting that
the plenary power was established on the basis of extraconstitutional reasoning, “relating to
colonial discovery and the Indians’ aboriginal status” and that the “constitutionalization” of
the plenary power has changed over time); Clinton, supra note 55, at 235–46 (arguing that
Indian Tribes are not subject to federal supremacy); Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its
Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754,
1760–61, 1765 (1997) [hereinafter Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents] (describing
the plenary power as based on “fiction,” given its absence in the text of the Constitution);
102
103
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The academic criticisms have gained some traction within the
Supreme Court. In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas said of the plenary
power that he “cannot locate such congressional authority in the Treaty
Clause . . . or the Indian Commerce Clause.” 104 Reasonably enough, Thomas
pointed out that the longstanding idea of retained, inherent tribal sovereignty
stands in tension with the congressional plenary power over Indians and
Indian tribes, a power that includes the authority to terminate tribal
sovereignty altogether: “It is quite arguably the essence of sovereignty,”
Thomas wrote, “not to exist merely at the whim of an external
government.”105 But a close examination of the constitutional basis for the
plenary power must await another article. For present purposes, I take the
decisions issued by the Supreme Court since the nineteenth century at face
value and treat the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian
tribes as an established point of constitutional law.
B. The Vulnerability of Morton v. Mancari
For nearly half a century, Morton v. Mancari has largely insulated
federal statutory and regulatory classifications involving Indians or Indian
tribes from strict scrutiny; if left undisturbed, the case provides a framework
for the favorable resolution of equal-protection challenges to federal Indian
law. But Mancari stands on doubtful reasoning, and both courts and
commentators question its legitimacy, with some arguing that many or even
Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 33–74 (1996)
(examining the ways in which Congressional plenary power, as reflected in federal Indian
law, creates constitutional problems); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier:
The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1579
(1996) (reporting the position held by some that Cohen and the Marshall Trilogy “unduly
dignif[y] a congressional power over Indian affairs based on a self-legitimating colonialist
theory” and condemning “the pernicious potential of plenary power of Congress to divest and
alter the powers of Indian tribes”); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV.
381, 395 n.59 (1993) [hereinafter Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present] (expressing “serious
qualms about the plenary power doctrine as a congressional sword against the tribes . . .”);
Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of
Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1204–05 (1990) [hereinafter Frickey,
Congressional Intent] (citing scholarly criticism that the plenary power doctrine “lacks a
constitutional basis”); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1, 46–55 (1987) (suggesting that there may not be a legitimate basis for
finding such a broad power); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 228–36 (1984) (surveying a series of
decisions in which the Court repudiated the idea that the plenary power prohibited courts
from hearing Indian tribes’ constitutional claims).
104
Lara, 541 U.S. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
105
Id. at 218.
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all classifications involving Indians or Indian tribes should be treated as
suspect. These criticisms make it necessary to reconsider da capo how the
equal-protection requirement applies to federal Indian law. If the focus is
shifted from the people who are the subject of federal Indian law—that is,
Indians and Indian tribes—to the governmental body with responsibility for
federal Indian law—that is, the U.S. Congress—it becomes clear that the
nature of the congressional power is central to the equal-protection analysis.
Mancari involved an equal-protection challenge to an employment
preference for Indians at the BIA. Congress had authorized the preference in
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 106 but BIA practice for decades had
limited the preference to initial hiring decisions. 107 In 1972, the BIA
expanded it to cover “situation[s] where an Indian and a non-Indian, both
already employed by the BIA, were competing for a promotion within the
Bureau.”108 A group of non-Indian BIA employees challenged the expanded
preference as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause (by way of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the preference. Noting that
federal policies for Indian preferences in “the Indian service” reach back, in
one form or another, to 1834, the Court said that the “purpose of these
preferences, as variously expressed in the legislative history, has been to give
Indians a greater participation in their own self-government; to further the
Government’s trust obligation toward the Indian tribes; and to reduce the
negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect Indian
tribal life.”109 “Resolution” of the equal-protection question, the Court said,
“turns on the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law and upon
the plenary power of Congress . . . to legislate on behalf of federally
recognized Indian tribes.”110 The Court pointed out that all Indian legislation
makes distinctions between Indians and non-Indians and that, if those laws
were struck down as a violation of the equal-protection requirement, Title 25
of the U.S. Code “would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment
of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”111
Then, in a problematic move, the Court said that the BIA employment
preference did not constitute “racial discrimination” because it was “not even
a ‘racial’ preference.”112 The Court maintained that the preference, which
looked to both Indian descent and membership in a recognized Indian tribe,

106

Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101–29).
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 538 (1974).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 541–42.
110
Id. at 551.
111
Id. at 552.
112
Id. at 553.
107
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was “political rather than racial in nature.”113 The Court’s aim was to tie the
BIA employment preference to the federal government’s objective of
promoting tribal self-determination and to the federal government’s “unique
obligation” to Indians and Indian tribes, an obligation that the Court attributed
to the historic dispossession of tribal lands.114 “The preference, as applied,”
the Court stressed, “is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but,
rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and
activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.”115 In the Court’s
view, the employment preference was “reasonably designed to further the
cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the
needs of its constituent groups.”116
The legal rule that emerged (or that appeared to emerge) from
Mancari is that any “special treatment” of Indians that “can be tied rationally
to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians . . . will
not be disturbed.”117 For that reason, any preference, such as the BIA
employment preference, that is “reasonable and rationally designed to further
Indian self-government” does not violate the equal-protection requirement.118
This, in effect, subjects classifications involving Indians or Indian tribes to a
modified form of rational-basis review.119 Mancari has remained the controlling
precedent for the equal-protection analysis of federal Indian law ever since.
But the decision is vulnerable on several points. First is the Court’s
insistence that the employment preference was a “political” rather than a
“racial” classification. The Court said that, “[c]ontrary to the characterization
made by [the non-Indian plaintiffs], this preference does not constitute ‘racial
discrimination.’ Indeed, it is not even a ‘racial’ preference.”120 The Court
reasoned that the employment preference was “not directed towards a ‘racial’
group consisting of ‘Indians’” but that it applied “only to members of ‘federally
recognized’ tribes.”121 This, the Court noted, effectively excludes “many
individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians’” and concluded that
“[i]n this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature.”122

113

Id. at 553, n.24.
Id. at 552, 555.
115
Id. at 554.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 555.
118
Id.
119
Cf. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.04 n.41 (“While the much-quoted standard
from Mancari indicates a slightly lower level of deference than mere rationality review, the
case law appears to apply ordinary rational basis review.”).
120
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553.
121
Id. at 553 n.24.
122
Id.
114
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This reasoning is simply wrong. As mandated by federal law,123 most
federally recognized Indian tribes generally require some measure of Indian
descent as a condition for membership, such that even an employment
preference limited only to members of Indian tribes would indirectly
incorporate a racial component. Additionally, the preference upheld in
Mancari expressly required both membership in a federally recognized Indian
tribe and “one-fourth or more degree Indian blood.”124 Thus, as commentators
have noted, Mancari elided the racial element of the employment preference,
treating it as a political—and therefore as a non-suspect classification— rather
than as a racial—and therefore as a suspect—classification.125
Properly understood, the BIA employment preference was neither
exclusively political nor exclusively racial. It was both, and that raises the
question of how a mixed classification should be treated for equal-protection
purposes. The loose reasoning in Mancari does not resolve the issue; it does
not really even address it—it simply evades it. That tactic works so long as a
majority of the Supreme Court is willing to play along—and it is possible that
a majority will be willing to do so indefinitely in order to avoid the difficult
confrontation between the equal-protection requirement and federal Indian law.
But the fiat declaration that a mixed political-and-racial classification is
123

United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
125
See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 110 (referring to this portion of Mancari as
“superficially theorized”); Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal
Indian Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1165, 1185 (2010) (stating of the Mancari “political rather
than racial in nature” rationale that, “[a]lthough this might be interpreted to mean that
classifications of tribal members are not racial at all, this conclusion is dissatisfying,
particularly because the challenged regulation itself required individuals to be both tribal
members and have at least one-quarter Indian blood to qualify for the preference”); Gould,
supra note 20, at 725 (calling the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale of Mancari
“disingenuous”); Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents, supra note 103, at 1762
(“[U]nder the [BIA] regulation [in Mancari], then, race, as measured by blood quantum, was
a but-for requirement of eligibility for the preference. The Court in Mancari did not pause to
ponder this problem.”); David C. Williams, Sometimes Suspect: A Response to Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose, 39 UCLA L. REV. 191, 198 (1991) [hereinafter Williams, Sometimes
Suspect] (“I fear that the Court’s approach in Mancari—denying that Indian law is racebased—will encourage a fast-and-loose attitude toward the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause, because the approach is so palpably a fiction.”); Carole GoldbergAmbrose, Not “Strictly” Racial: A Response to “Indians as Peoples,” 39 UCLA L. REV.
169, 173 (1991) (“[G]iven the typical criteria for tribal membership, it is foolish to call
classifications involving tribal Indians anything other than ‘race-plus.’ . . . By denying that
Indian-based classifications are racial, Mancari both defied logic and undermined federal
policy supporting tribal self-determination.”); David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal
Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759, 792–810 (1991) [hereinafter
Williams, Indians as Peoples] (criticizing the “political rather than racial in nature”
rationale); Newton, supra note 103, at 272 n.441 (calling the “political rather than racial in
nature” rationale of Mancari “disingenuous”).
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exclusively political fools no one, least of all those who think that classifications
involving Indians or Indian tribes should be subject to strict scrutiny.
One way to reconsider the point would be to ask the questions that the
Court in Mancari decided to dodge: Does inclusion of the racial component
in the employment preference taint or otherwise overcome the political
component in the preference, so that the preference must be reviewed under
the strict-scrutiny standard? Or does the inclusion of the political component
purge or otherwise neutralize the racial component, so that the preference
must be reviewed under the rational-basis standard? It should be readily
apparent that laying a suspect classification over a non-suspect classification
(or for that matter, laying a non-suspect classification over a suspect
classification) should not defeat strict scrutiny. After all, a law requiring
African Americans with valid car registrations to drive five miles per hour
below the posted speed limit would include both a suspect classification (being
African American) and a non-suspect classification (having a valid car
registration). But who honestly could say that such a law would not
discriminate on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause?126
To reframe the point in terms closer to Mancari, if the BIA had
maintained an employment policy against hiring or promoting any member
of a federally recognized Indian tribe who was of “one-fourth or more degree
Indian blood,” the Court presumably would have struck that policy down as
a violation of the equal-protection requirement. And regardless of one’s
general views on the constitutionality of affirmative action, the initial
analytical move should be the same in both cases: Either the combination of
a non-suspect classification with a suspect classification removes the
governmental action from strict-scrutiny review, or it does not. Intuitions about
the unconstitutionality of a driving restriction on African Americans with valid
car registrations and the unconstitutionality of an employment ban on Indians
who are members of Indian tribes confirm that the Supreme Court erred on that
initial analytical move.127 This is not to say that the outcome in Mancari is
wrong, but it is to say that a critical piece of its rationale is fundamentally flawed.
See, e.g., Williams, Indians as Peoples, supra note 125, at 807 (“It cannot be . . . that the
simple addition of a nonsuspect trait to a suspect one yields a nonsuspect class.”).
127
The Court used similar bad reasoning in Geduldig v. Aiello to hold that the exclusion of
pregnancy from a state disability-insurance program maintained by California was not a
classification based on sex for purposes of the equal-protection requirement. 417 U.S. 484
(1974). Geduldig and Mancari were both decided on June 17, 1974, although Justice Stewart
wrote the opinion in Geduldig and Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion in Mancari. In a
footnote dismissing the equal-protection argument, the Court in Geduldig said that the case
was “a far cry from cases . . . involving discrimination based upon gender as such” and that
although “only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative
classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification.” Id. at 496 n.20. Echoing
Mancari, the Court reasoned that “[t]he lack of identity between the excluded disability and
126
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The Supreme Court signaled some uneasiness with the Mancari
“political rather than racial in nature” rationale in Rice v. Cayetano, a 2000
decision invalidating a provision of the Hawaii state constitution that limited
voting for the trustees of a state agency to “Hawaiians.”128 The Court determined
that, in defining the term “Hawaiians” to include only descendants of the people
who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands in 1778 (the year of initial European
contact),129 the state constitution used ancestry as a proxy for race.130 Although
the Court reaffirmed the general applicability of Mancari to classifications
involving Indians or Indian tribes (and even quoted the “political rather than
racial in nature” rationale),131 it determined that classifications involving
“Hawaiians” and “Native Hawaiians” are strictly racial and therefore
impermissible under the Fifteenth Amendment.132 The Rice Court said that
“[s]imply because a class defined by ancestry does not include all members of
the race does not suffice to make the classification race neutral.”133 That
undercuts the reasoning in Mancari that the BIA employment preference was
“not directed toward a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’” because it applied
“only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes” and effectively excluded
“many individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’” 134 More
broadly, Rice implies that pairing a non-racial classification with a racial
classification does not remove the constitutional problems associated with
the racial classification. Whether the Court might revisit Mancari on that
basis remains an open question.135
gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis”
because “[t]he program divides potential recipients into two groups—pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons”—with “the first group [being] exclusively female, [and] the second
includ[ing] members of both sexes.” Id. In Mancari, the point was that the employment
preference could not be racial discrimination because it favored some Indians (those who
were tribal members) but not other Indians (those who were not tribal members). In
Geduldig, the point was that the pregnancy dispreference could not be sex discrimination
because it disfavored some women (those who were pregnant) but not other women (those
were not pregnant). In both decisions, the Court would have been well advised to undertake
something more than “the most cursory analysis.”
128
528 U.S. 495, 520 (2000).
129
Id. at 509.
130
Id. at 514.
131
Id. at 514–17.
132
Id. at 517. The Court also indicated that Mancari would not protect a voting arrangement
(other than one for internal tribal governments) using a classification involving Indians or
Indian tribes: “It does not follow from Mancari . . . that Congress may authorize a State to
establish a voting scheme that limits the electorate for its public officials to a class of tribal
Indians, to the exclusion of all non-Indian citizens.” Id. at 520.
133
Id. at 516–17.
134
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974).
135
For a close study of the equal-protection issues raised by preferences for Native
Hawaiians, see generally Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special
Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537 (1996).
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The second point of vulnerability for Mancari is the Court’s separate
reliance on the federal government’s “unique obligation” to the Indian tribes.
In truth, this part of the opinion is muddled (after all, it was written by Justice
Blackmun). The Court initially framed the equal-protection question as a
matter of determining “whether . . . the [employment] preference constitutes
invidious racial discrimination,”136 but it immediately said that “[r]esolution
of [that] issue turns on the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal
law and upon the plenary power of Congress, based on a history of treaties
and the assumption of ‘guardian-ward’ status, to legislate on behalf of
federally recognized Indian tribes.”137 Noting that “[l]iterally every piece of
legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations . . . single[s] out for
special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near
reservations,” the Court correctly observed that finding “invidious racial
discrimination” in the employment preference would “effectively erase[]”
Title 25 of the U.S. Code and “jeopardize[]” the “solemn commitment of the
Government toward the Indians.”138
This is where matters become obscure. Having made this point about
the place of Indians in federal law, the Court suggested that it provides only
“historical and legal context” and quickly moved to argue that the
employment preference is “political rather than racial in nature.”139 But then
the Court switched back to the relationship between the federal government
and Indians, concluding that “[a]s long as the special treatment” of Indians
“can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation
toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.” 140 It is
therefore hard to determine how much the government’s “unique obligation”
provides a justification for the outcome that is independent of the “political
rather than racial in nature” rationale.
Quite apart from the slipshod reasoning, the “unique obligation”
rationale is problematic because, as a matter of positive constitutional law,
the existence of that obligation is wholly dependent on the will of Congress.
For more than a century, it has been black-letter law that Congress can
redefine or even terminate the government’s “unique obligation” to the
tribes.141 In fact, Congress did terminate its “unique obligation” to more than
one hundred Indian tribes during the period known as the “termination era”
of federal Indian law (which ran roughly from the 1940s to the 1960s).142 My
meaning here should not be misunderstood. In my view, it is incontestable that,
136

Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551.
Id.
138
Id. at 552.
139
Id. at 553.
140
Id. at 555.
141
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1886).
142
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 1.06.
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as a political and moral matter, the U.S. government has a unique and indeed
compelling obligation to the Indian tribes and that the tribes have an
indefeasible claim to sovereignty. But the place of Indian tribes in U.S. law is
both pre-constitutional and extra-constitutional. However compelling as a
political and moral matter, constitutional law leaves it to Congress to decide
whether and on what terms to honor the government’s obligation and whether
and on what terms to continue Indian tribal sovereignty.
To suggest, as Mancari does, that the equal-protection status of
federal Indian law turns on the government’s “unique obligation” to the
Indian tribes is really to say that the equal-protection status of federal Indian
law turns on the continuing will of Congress not to repudiate that obligation.
This leaves the exemption from strict scrutiny of federal classifications
involving Indians or Indian tribes highly precarious. It necessarily implies
that if Congress repudiates its obligation to the Indian tribes, any subsequent
legislation that either favors or disfavors Indians and Indian tribes would have
to be reviewed under the strict-scrutiny standard. It also implies that if
Congress terminates federal recognition of a particular Indian tribe and then
later re-confers federal recognition on that tribe—something Congress in fact
did during and after the termination era143—the new federal recognition
would have to be reviewed under the strict-scrutiny standard. Surely Justice
Blackmun would have written a different opinion if he had thought his
reasoning all the way through to its problematic implications.
Mancari thus includes two rationales that potentially justify the
outcome in the case, but both present difficulties. The “political rather than
racial in nature” rationale simply mischaracterizes classifications involving
Indians or Indian tribes, including the classification at issue in Mancari. The
“unique obligation” rationale leaves the equal-protection status of federal
Indian law contingent on Congress not modifying or repudiating that unique
obligation. To compound matters, the relationship between the two strands is
exquisitely unclear. Is either rationale sufficient on its own to justify the result?
Are both necessary? Perhaps the most faithful reading of the opinion is that
the employment preference is “political rather than racial in nature” because
of the government’s “unique obligation.” That does not really make much
sense, but it does appear to be what Justice Blackmun was trying to say.
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court itself appears to have had
difficulty deciding what Mancari means. The Court has relied on Mancari six
times to reject equal-protection challenges to classifications involving
Indians or Indian tribes, but it has equivocated between the “political rather
than racial in nature” rationale and the “unique obligation” rationale. In
Fisher v. District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District of Montana, a 1976
per curiam decision, the Court leaned on both rationales to hold that requiring
143

Id.
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a member of an Indian tribe to litigate a child-custody proceeding in tribal
court rather than state court does not violate the equal-protection
requirement.144 The Court reasoned that the tribal court’s jurisdiction did “not
derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign
status” of the tribe and that enforcing exclusive tribal-court jurisdiction
“further[ed] the congressional policy of Indian self-government.”145 Another
unanimous decision issued in 1976, Moe v. Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, relied only on the “unique
obligation” rationale to reject an equal-protection challenge to the federal
exemption of Indians from state taxation. 146 So too did Delaware Tribal
Business Committee v. Weeks, which rejected an equal-protection challenge
to a distribution of federal funds to the Cherokee Delawares and the Absentee
Delawares but not to the Kansas Delawares.147
But in 1977, United States v. Antelope looked only to the “political
rather than racial in nature” rationale. 148 Antelope held that the conviction of
an Indian defendant for felony murder under the federal Major Crimes Act
did not violate the equal-protection requirement, even though the defendant
could not have been charged with felony murder if he had been a non-Indian
defendant.149 The classification worked to the obvious disadvantage of the
Indian defendant and did not further tribal self-government, so the “unique
obligation” rationale was unavailable to the Court. The unanimous opinion
read Mancari and Fisher to say that “federal regulation of Indian affairs . . .
is rooted in the unique status of Indians as ‘a separate people’ with their own
political institutions” and “is not to be viewed as legislation of a ‘racial’
group.”150 Similarly, the Court’s 1979 decision in Washington v.
Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation looked only to
the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale in rejecting an equalprotection challenge to the State of Washington’s unilateral assumption of
criminal and civil jurisdiction over some, but not all, matters involving Indians

144

424 U.S. 382, 390–91 (1976).
Id.
146
425 U.S. 463, 479–81 (1976). Although the Court in Moe pointed out that Mancari had
said that “these kinds of statutory preferences” are not “‘racial’ in character,” it pointed to
the “unique obligation” rationale as “[t]he test” applicable to federal classifications involving
Indians or Indian tribes. Id. at 480. For that reason, the case is best read as relying only on
the “unique obligation” rationale.
147
430 U.S. 73, 84–85 (1977). The Cherokee Delawares and the Absentee Delawares were
both federally recognized tribes; the Kansas Delawares were not. Id. at 85.
148
430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977).
149
Id. at 644, 646–47.
150
Id.
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or Indian tribes.151 As in Antelope, the classification worked to the disadvantage
of the Indians (the challenge was brought by the Yakima Indian Nation), so the
“unique obligation” rationale again was not plausible. The Court reasoned that
the “unique legal status” of the Indians “permits the Federal Government to
enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be
constitutionally offensive.”152 Later in 1979, in Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, the Court returned to the
“unique obligation” rationale to reject an equal-protection challenge to treaty
provisions reserving fishing rights to Indians.153
What, then, is the meaning of Mancari? Does Mancari stand for the
proposition that federal classifications involving Indians or Indian tribes are
not subject to strict scrutiny because they are always “political rather than
racial in nature”? Antelope and Yakima Indian Nation support that reading,
but Moe, Delaware Tribal Business Committee, and Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel indicate otherwise. Does Mancari
stand for the proposition that federal classifications involving Indians or
Indian tribes are not subject to strict scrutiny as long as they further the
federal government’s “unique obligation” to Indians and Indian tribes? Moe,
Delaware Tribal Business Committee, and Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel support that reading, but Antelope and Yakima
Indian Nation indicate otherwise. Fisher suggests that the exemption from
strict scrutiny rests on both rationales together.
Perhaps the most accurate reading of these cases is that federal
classifications favorable to Indians are not subject to strict scrutiny by reason
of the “unique obligation” rationale (Moe, Delaware Tribal Business
Committee,154 and Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel)
and that federal classifications unfavorable to Indians are not subject to strict
scrutiny by reason of the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale
(Antelope and Yakima Indian Nation).155 If that is the best that can be said of
Mancari, the legitimacy of the decision is rightly open to doubt. On this
439 U.S. 463, 500–02 (1979). Without mentioning the “unique obligation” rationale, the
Court in Yakima Indian Nation said that “classifications based on tribal status and land tenure
inhere in many of the decisions of this Court involving jurisdictional controversies between
tribal Indians and the States” and that “the argument that such classifications are ‘suspect’”
is “untenable.” Id. at 501.
152
Id. at 500–01.
153
443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979).
154
The federal statute at issue in Delaware Tribal Business Committee, which involved the
distribution among Delaware Indians of a specified amount appropriated by Congress, was
favorable to two recognized tribes (the Cherokee Delawares and the Absentee Delawares)
but pro tanto unfavorable to a non-tribal group of Indians (the Kansas Delawares).
155
Note that the tribal ordinance in Fisher, which the Court upheld by reference to both the
“political rather than racial in nature” rationale and the “unique obligation” rationale, was
favorable to the tribe as a whole and unfavorable to a particular member of the tribe.
151
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reading, no federal classification involving Indians or Indian tribes is subject
to strict scrutiny, but the Court cannot identify a principled justification for
the result. That hardly suggests that advocates of tribal interests should rest
easy about the future of federal Indian law.
Finally, Mancari is vulnerable because of subsequent developments
under the Equal Protection Clause. When the Court decided Mancari in 1974,
it had not yet addressed the constitutionality of affirmative action. But there
has been a lot of water over that dam since then. The Court’s first affirmativeaction case, DeFunis v. Odegard, was brought by a white applicant who had
been denied admission to the University of Washington School of Law. 156
The school admitted the applicant while his challenge was pending, and the
Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot on April 23, 1974—just one day
before it heard oral argument in Mancari.157 Four years later, the Court, in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, took up the substantive
question that it had not decided in DeFunis.158 In a fragmented decision, the
Court upheld the use of race as one factor in admissions for a public medical
school but rejected a hard quota for non-white students.159 Decisions after
Bakke generally (but not invariably) have sustained affirmative action in
higher-education admissions 160 but have struck down affirmative action in
other areas, such as government contracting.161
It is possible, then, that the reasoning and the outcome of Mancari are
products of the time the case was decided, a time when the Supreme Court
was just beginning—in a tentative, uncertain manner—to address affirmative
action. Mancari came hard on the heels of DeFunis, which had avoided the
issue. And in fact, the Court in Mancari stressed what it was not deciding just
as much as what it was deciding. The opinion emphasized that the preference
“applie[d] only to employment in the Indian service.”162 It did not, the Court
156

416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974) (per curiam).
Id. at 315, 319–20.
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438 U.S. 265 (1978).
159
Id. at 316–20.
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See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016) (upholding the
university’s affirmative action plan because it was narrowly tailored to achieve the benefits
of student body diversity); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (concluding that
the Equal Protection Clause did not “prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race
in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits
that flow from a diverse student body”). But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275–76
(2003) (holding that “the University’s use of race in its . . . admissions policy” violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it was not “narrowly tailored to achieve respondents’
asserted compelling interest in diversity . . .”).
161
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505–06, 511 (1989) (striking
down a city program that required prime contractors on city construction contracts to
subcontract with minority-owned businesses because the city “failed to demonstrate a
compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race”).
162
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
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said, “cover any other Government agency or activity,” and it therefore did
not require the Court to consider “the obviously more difficult question that
would be presented by a blanket exemption for Indians from all civil service
examinations.”163 In other words, the Court treated the case as particular to
Indian law, and it did not reach for the broader affirmative-action questions
that it had avoided in DeFunis and that it would struggle with in Bakke.
Since Mancari was decided in 1974, the membership of the Supreme
Court has turned over completely, and, no less importantly, the Court has
developed more definite views about the constitutionality of affirmativeaction programs. Although the Court has relied on Mancari six times in
rejecting equal-protection challenges to federal Indian law (Fisher, Moe,
Delaware Tribal Business Committee, Antelope, Yakima Indian Nation, and
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel), it has not done so
once since 1979. Mancari was a unanimous decision, but it is not at all clear
that the Court would reach the same result today if it considered the BIA
employment preference as a matter of first impression or if it reconsidered
Mancari in light of subsequent case law. Perhaps the Mancari equalprotection approach is an artifact of a Court that was still unsure how to
address the constitutionality of affirmative action as a general matter; perhaps
the idea of Indian-law exceptionalism gave the Court an easy answer to a hard
question. The Court’s most recent move in this area, made in 2013, was its
statement in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl that the Indian-adoption
preferences in the Indian Child Welfare Act might “raise equal protection
concerns.”164 There is little evidence either way about whether the Court
would analyze a preference for Indians and Indian tribes differently from any
other race-based preference.
In short, from the perspective of those of us who are sympathetic to
contemporary federal Indian policy, the Mancari approach produces
generally acceptable results in the application of the equal-protection
requirement. The Supreme Court has never struck down any provision of
federal Indian law under Mancari. But litigants and lower federal courts are
putting new pressure on Mancari, and the decision is vulnerable to either
piecemeal or wholesale reconsideration. 165 The case pretends that an
163

Id.
570 U.S 637, 656 (2013). In 2004, the Court decided not to address whether a federal
statute restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians violated the equalprotection requirement. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 209 (2004). A later decision by
the Ninth Circuit found the equal-protection argument from Lara sympathetic but decided
that it was foreclosed by Mancari and Antelope. Means v. Navajo Nation, 420 F.3d 1037,
1044–46 (9th Cir. 2005).
165
See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, “With the Indian Tribes”: Race, Citizenship, and Original
Constitutional Meanings, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (2018) (noting criticisms of Mancari
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employment preference based on both political status and race is “political
rather than racial in nature.” That inartful move is transparently false. The
case purports to rest in part on the “unique obligation” of the federal
government to Indians, but Congress can abolish that “unique obligation” at
any time, thereby completely upsetting the equal-protection analysis.
Subsequent decisions equivocate on which of the case’s two rationales is
dispositive. And the case was decided early in the arc of the Court’s
developing views on affirmative action. Mancari has protected federal Indian
law from equal-protection challenges for most of the past half century, but
there is reason to doubt that it will continue to do so in the years to come.
C. The Case for Rational-Basis Review of Federal Indian Law
There is another way forward in defending the constitutionality of
federal Indian law, one that does not rely on the questionable reasoning and
doubtful future of Mancari but that still draws substantial support from
Supreme Court case law. The plenary power that Congress has over Indians
and Indian tribes, as described time and again by the Supreme Court over the
past 135 years, precludes the application of strict scrutiny and compels the
application of rational-basis review to federal statutory and regulatory
classifications involving Indians or Indian tribes. Like Mancari, the plenarypower approach set out here validates most (or even all) of federal Indian
law under the equal-protection requirement. And the plenary-power
approach is consistent with how the Court analyzes equal-protection
questions under federal immigration law—another policy domain in which
Congress has plenary power.

by litigants); Gregory Smith & Caroline Mayhew, Apocalypse Now: The Unrelenting Assault
on Morton v. Mancari, FEDERAL LAWYER, Apr. 2013, at 51–55 (2013) (detailing challenges
to Mancari brought in the lower courts); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir.
1997) (suggesting the possibility that, following Adarand, “Mancari’s days are numbered”);
KG Urban Enters. v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 403–04 (D. Mass. 2012) (criticizing
Mancari as based on an “irrational assumption” about the significance of race and tribal
membership). See also En Banc Brief of Individual Plaintiff-Appellees at 2–3, 32, Brackeen
v. Bernhardt, No. 18–11479 (5th Cir., Jan. 7, 2020) (arguing for narrow interpretation of
Mancari). As Carole Goldberg notes, “affirmative action opponents” have undertaken “to
confine or to overturn Mancari through scholarly work, litigation, and legislation.”
Goldberg, supra note 75, at 951. See also Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1373, 1375 (2002) (arguing that the courts “use racialization to trigger strict scrutiny
under equal protection law”).
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1. The plenary-power approach to equal protection
The argument is straightforward. As explained above,166 the
congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes is a general police
power, similar in scope and substance both to the police power that states
exercise within their borders and the police power that Congress exercises
over places of exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as the District of Columbia,
U.S. territories and possessions, and military installations.167 With respect to
Indians and Indian tribes, then, Congress has the power to control matters that
otherwise would be subject to comprehensive state regulation—such as
education, public health and safety, housing, land ownership, land use, the
protection and exploitation of natural resources, crimes and criminal
punishment, child welfare and child custody, and testate and intestate
succession.168 Moreover, this congressional authority is exclusive of state
authority, preempting the traditional police power of the states, at least as to
matters within Indian country.169 Although Congress recognizes significant
powers of tribal self-government, it holds the exclusive authority, as between
the federal government and the state governments, to exercise traditional
police power over Indians and Indian tribes.
But unlike a state’s police power, which is general over all persons
within the state (apart from Indians and Indian tribes), the congressional
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes is not general over all persons
within the U.S. By definition, this plenary power is limited to Indians and
Indian tribes because the Tenth Amendment otherwise reserves the general
police power to the states.170 In order to exercise its police power over Indians
and Indian tribes, Congress necessarily distinguishes between Indians and
non-Indians, between tribal members and non-members, and between tribes
and all other groups subject to U.S. jurisdiction. But almost every (perhaps
every) segment of federal Indian law—whether it references individual
Indians, tribal members, or Indian tribes—directly or indirectly incorporates
Indian descent and, thus, race.171
This is where the conflict between the congressional plenary power
and the equal-protection requirement arises. The Court cannot both recognize
the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes and also
demand that Congress exercise that power without marking off Indians and
Indian tribes for separate treatment. Congress cannot, for example, provide a
166

See supra Section I.A.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.02.
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See supra Section I.A.
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COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.02.
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See Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919)
(stating that the police power is “reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment”).
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See supra Section I.A.
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comprehensive program for the primary and secondary education of Indian
children without differentiating between Indian children and non-Indian
children, and Congress cannot recognize or otherwise provide for selfgovernment by tribal members without distinguishing between such
members and non-members. The exercise of the plenary power makes such
distinctions unavoidable. To require that Congress exercise its plenary power
without using a classification involving Indians or Indian tribes is to forbid
Congress from exercising the power at all.
Under the Court’s standard approach to the equal-protection
requirement, a race-based classification triggers strict scrutiny, and strict
scrutiny requires that the underlying legislation or regulation be “narrowly
tailored” to achieve a “compelling governmental interest.” To permit only
such federal Indian legislation as would pass review under the strict-scrutiny
standard would be to limit Congress to legislation furthering only
compelling governmental objectives—hardly the material that makes up
much of Title 25 of the U.S. Code. The plenary power is so extensive that
it displaces and substitutes for the general police power of the states; it
permits Congress to regulate even the most quotidian matters for Indians and
Indian tribes, such as the number of witnesses needed for an attested will or
the requirements for obtaining a hunting license. 172 This is not the stuff of
compelling governmental interests.
The congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes is
therefore inconsistent with strict scrutiny of federal Indian legislation.
Recognition of this inconsistency is implicit in Mancari, even though the
Court clumsily tried to avoid that difficulty by insisting that the classification
used in the BIA employment preference was “political rather than racial in
nature.” But the unarticulated premise of Mancari is correct all the same: As
between the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes and
strict scrutiny of federal Indian law, one of the two must give way. The Supreme
Court has recognized the congressional plenary power for well over a century,
and apart from the doubts raised by Justice Thomas, the Court has shown no
inclination to reconsider it. The plenary power, then, must trump strict scrutiny.
For that reason, the right approach in reviewing federal Indian law
under the equal-protection requirement is to determine whether the
legislation or regulation at issue is a reasonable exercise of Congress’s
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes. As discussed in greater detail
below, this approach is similar to—but different from—the Court’s approach
in Mancari. Admittedly, this approach implies a forgiving standard of review,
and it generally validates most federal Indian law (with different effects on
172

It makes no difference that Congress typically allows tribal governments to regulate such
matters. The critical point is that the plenary power permits Congress to regulate such matters
as they relate to Indians.
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state laws). It does, however, reconcile the congressional plenary power over
Indians and Indian tribes with the equal-protection requirement, rather than
use the latter to defeat the former. In short, it puts federal Indian law on a
more definite and more secure equal-protection foundation.
2. The parallel to immigration law
The plenary-power approach described here is precisely the approach
taken by the Supreme Court for immigration law.173 The Court has
recognized congressional plenary power over immigration policy for well
over a century.174 Justice Clark wrote in Boutilier v. INS that “[i]t has long
been held that the Congress has plenary power to make rules for the
admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess characteristics which
Congress has forbidden.”175 In Department of Homeland Security v.
Thuraissigiam,176 decided in June of 2020, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
congressional plenary power, saying that “the Constitution gives ‘the political
department of the government’ plenary authority to decide which aliens to
admit”177 and that “the Constitution gives Congress plenary power to set
requirements for admission.”178
The Court’s initial recognition and pronouncement of this
congressional plenary power in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (also known
as The Chinese Exclusion Case)179 followed the Court’s recognition and
pronouncement of the plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes in United
173

To be clear, I am not suggesting that Indians, whether or not tribal members, are aliens or
that they should be treated as such. Under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, all Indians are citizens of the United States. U.S. CONST,
amend. XIV, § 1; 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b). But see Cleveland, supra note 103, at 77 (“Naturalborn citizenship for Indians born as tribal members continues to be bestowed by statute,
rather than as a matter of constitutional right, and commentators have questioned whether
Congress, under the plenary power doctrine, might retain power to de-naturalize Indians.”).
Instead, I am arguing that the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes is
parallel to the congressional plenary power over immigration and that the two plenary powers
have parallel implications for the equal-protection requirement.
174
BEN HARRINGTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44969, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT’S POWER TO EXCLUDE ALIENS 1–4 (2017). See generally David A. Martin,
Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29 (2015)
(explaining persistence of plenary power doctrine in immigration law).
175
387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).
176
140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
177
Id. at 1982.
178
Id. at 1980 n.26. See also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547
(1990) (“[I]n general, the [plenary-power] doctrine declares that Congress and the executive
branch have broad and often exclusive authority over immigration decisions.”).
179
130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
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States v. Kagama by only three years.180 Chae Chan Ping was decided in
1889; Kagama was decided in 1886. The parallels between the two cases are
striking. Both decisions were unanimous. Both decisions identified a
congressional plenary power over a defined policy area—immigration in
Chae Chan Ping, Indians and Indian tribes in Kagama. Both reflect the
implicit, self-confident assumption of federal supremacy prevailing in the
decades following the Civil War. And notwithstanding that both decisions
lean heavily on the endemic racism and nationalism of the late nineteenth
century, both remain foundational precedents.181
Additionally, both decisions were unable to locate a precise
constitutional basis for the plenary powers that they described. Instead, both
invoked the amorphous but important idea of “national sovereignty” as the
constitutional justification. In Chae Chan Ping, upholding the
constitutionality of the Scott Act (which banned the return of Chinese
workers to the U.S.),182 Justice Field wrote:
That the government of the United States, through the action
of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its
territory is a proposition which we do not think open to
controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent
is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its
independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that
extent subject to the control of another power. . . . The power
of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of
those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the
right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the
government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be
granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.183
And in Kagama, upholding the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act
(which made certain crimes committed by Indians federal offenses),184
Justice Miller wrote:

180

118 U.S. 375, 383–85 (1886).
In a thorough and penetrating analysis, Sarah H. Cleveland identifies Kagama as
inaugurating a “plenary power era” in which the Supreme Court attributed to the federal
government plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, immigrants and aliens, and the
territories of the United States. See generally Cleveland, supra note 103. In other words, she
has explored at length the parallel origins of the congressional plenary power over Indian
policy and the congressional plenary power over immigration policy. For Cleveland’s views
on the nativism, imperialism, and bigotries that, in part, motivated the turn toward plenary
powers, see id. at 258–67.
182
Pub. L. 50–1064, 25 Stat. 504.
183
130 U.S. at 603–04, 609.
184
23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
181
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It seems to us that this [sc. imposing federal jurisdiction over
the designated crimes] is within the competency of Congress.
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States. Dependent
largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights
. . . . The power of the General Government over these
remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished
in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that
government, because it never has existed anywhere else,
because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical
limits of the United States, because it has never been denied,
and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.185
In both Chae Chan Ping and Kagama, then, the Court in effect held that
power over the policy area in question—immigration or Indians and Indian
tribes—must be located somewhere in government and that because those
policy areas directly implicate national sovereignty, the power must reside
with the federal government and, specifically, with Congress.
When nearly a century later the Supreme Court confronted the
application of the equal-protection requirement to laws enacted under the
congressional plenary powers recognized by Chae Chan Ping and Kagama,
the Court determined that the proper approach is to use the rational-basis
standard of review. In 1974, the Court’s unanimous decision in Mancari
grounded rational-basis review of federal Indian law in the notion that, in part
because of the federal government’s “unique obligation,” the distinctions
drawn by Congress involving Indians or Indian tribes are “political rather
than racial in nature.” Just two years later, in 1976, the Court’s unanimous
decision in Mathews v. Diaz grounded rational-basis review of federal
immigration law directly in the congressional plenary power.186
Diaz considered an equal-protection challenge to a federal statute
making aliens ineligible to participate in Medicare unless they had been
admitted to the U.S. for permanent residence and had resided in the U.S. for
five years.187 The Court noted that the Fifth Amendment protects all aliens
within the U.S. “from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law”188 but also that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would
be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” 189 The Court reiterated its recognition
of the plenary power of the “political branches of the Federal Government”
185

118 U.S. at 383–85.
426 U.S. 67, 83–84 (1976).
187
Id. at 69–70.
188
Id. at 77.
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Id. at 79–80.
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over immigration, and it determined that “[t]he reasons that preclude judicial
review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration
and naturalization.”190 In rejecting the strict-scrutiny standard, the Court held
that neither the requirement of admission for permanent residence nor the
requirement of residency for five years was “wholly irrational.” 191 The Court
conceded that, under its earlier decision in Graham v. Richardson,192 any
state laws regulating aliens generally are subject to strict scrutiny, but the
Court insisted that there is no “political hypocrisy” in recognizing that “the
Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially different
from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over
immigration and naturalization.”193

190

Id. at 81–82.
Id. at 82–83.
192
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
193
Diaz, 426 U.S. at 86–87. The Court in Graham reasoned that alienage is a suspect
classification that triggers strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 403 U.S. at 372.
But under Diaz, federal classifications involving alienage are subject only to rational-basis
review. 426 U.S. at 83. Additionally, in later decisions, the Supreme Court determined that
state law classifications involving aliens with respect to “core governmental functions” (such
as law enforcement and public-school teaching) are subject only to rational-basis review.
See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978) (upholding a state statute limiting
eligibility for the police force to United States citizens because “the police function is one
where citizenship bears a rational relationship to the special demands” of the job); Yoshino,
supra note 25, at 756 n.65 (describing Foley’s determination that policing is a basic
government function and thus strict scrutiny is not applicable). Commentators have
questioned whether even Graham provides much protection to aliens. See, e.g., JennyBrooke Condon, The Preempting of Equal Protection for Immigrants?, 73 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 77, 102–03 (2016) (discussing how decisions subsequent to Graham, such as the
interpretation of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), have “upheld alienage-based restrictions in state public benefits schemes under
a rational basis scrutiny historically reserved for the federal government’s immigration
regulations”). Finally, Diaz itself has come in for heavy criticism. See, e.g., Victor C.
Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review of Federal
Alienage Classifications after Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 76 OR. L. REV. 425, 435–
37 (1997) (describing the Court in Diaz as having played the “plenary power card” despite
earlier in Graham finding alienage classifications inherently suspect); David F. Levi, Note,
The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069,
1085–86 (1979) (arguing that the Court’s application of a “low standard of review” in Diaz
was inconsistent with the idea in Graham “that aliens require special constitutional
protection”); Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment
by the National Government, SUP. CT. REV. 275, 314–17, 324–36 (1977) (arguing that Diaz
wrongly subjected a federal law to a lower level of scrutiny than the strict scrutiny used for
laws passed by state governments with regard to the rights of immigrants).
191
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Diaz reaches the analytically correct result, and parallel
considerations should drive the same outcome in federal Indian law.194 As the
Supreme Court has recognized for well over a century, Congress has plenary
power over immigration matters and plenary power over Indian and tribal
To be clear, I use the term “correct” to characterize the court’s doctrinal analysis—not to
make a normative judgment about whether it is right that Congress should have plenary
power over immigration (or over Indians) or whether it is right that federal classifications
involving aliens (or Indians) should not be subject to strict scrutiny. Instead, my point is that,
assuming a congressional plenary power over a group that constitutes a suspect class, the
exercise of that power should be reviewed only under a rational-basis standard. Like the
congressional plenary power over Indians, the congressional plenary power over
immigration remains intensely controversial. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 174, at 30 (“It
almost seems an obligatory rite of passage for scholars embarking on the study of
immigration law to provide their own critique of plenary power or related doctrines of
deference.”); Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
373, 381–82 (2004) (positing that plenary power should not serve as a barrier to
constitutional challenges in immigration law); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of
the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of
Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 36 (2003) (stating that “lawyers and legal scholars . . . have
a responsibility to call into question” the issues springing from the government’s plenary
power over immigration and Indians); T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 151–81 (2002)
(criticizing the plenary power in immigration law); Cleveland, supra note 104, at 124–34
(discussing the Supreme Court’s shift from a theory based in the Commerce Clause to one
“of inherent power” in order to justify Congress’s exercise of national power over resident
aliens); Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration
and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1616–19 (2000) (acknowledging that
congressional plenary power “has been the subject of much scholarly commentary”);
Motomura, supra note 178, at 547–48, 600–13 (arguing that protecting rights of immigrants
with “subconstitutional” reasons, without having to confront the government’s plenary
powers, leads to a series of problems including overbroad, underinclusive, or unpredictable
judicial norms); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century
of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 854–63 (1987) (describing
the “baleful influence” of the Court’s decision in The Chinese Exclusion Case and the need
for constitutional restraints on Congress’s plenary power over immigration, alienage, and
naturalization); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual
Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 25–29 (1985) (arguing that
the doctrine of the Chinese Exclusion Case allows “[o]fficial racial discrimination” and
should “join the relics of a bygone, unproud era”); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of
Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54–58 (1984) (determining that Plyler v. Doe was
“a fundamental break with classical immigration law’s concept of national community and
of the scope of congressional power to decide who is entitled to the benefits of
membership”); Rosberg, supra note 193, at 317 (“[T]he proposition that the federal
government has nearly limitless power [to control immigration] is open to serious question
on constitutional, historical, and logical grounds.”); cf. Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary
Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional
Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 287 (2000) (“If our immigration
law is not a kind of ‘laboratory of autocracy’ but is instead simply a part of our constitutional
law, the Court should say so.”).
194
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matters.195 In both situations, the plenary power ultimately derives from the
concept of national sovereignty, and in both cases, the plenary power is
exclusive and preemptive of state power. In Diaz, the Court acknowledged
that the federal government cannot exercise its plenary power over aliens
without drawing distinctions between aliens and citizens—or even among
aliens—that would fail the equal-protection requirement in other contexts.196
And in Diaz, the Court understood that this precludes application of the strictscrutiny standard and compels application of the rational-basis standard for
federal immigration law.197 Identical reasoning, mutatis mutandis, precludes
application of the strict-scrutiny standard and compels application of the
rational-basis standard for federal Indian law.
That is entirely proper, viewed in terms of how the equal-protection
requirement ought to function when the federal government exercises a
plenary power of this type. Under its standard approach to equal protection,
the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny whenever government uses one of
its general powers—such as the federal government’s power to regulate
interstate commerce or a state government’s police power—in a manner that
singles out a group for preferential or dispreferential treatment based on a
suspect classification, such as race or religion. And under the standard
approach, the Court applies rational-basis review whenever government uses
one of its general powers to legislate in a manner that singles out a group of
individuals for preferential or dispreferential treatment based on something
other than a suspect classification.
In either case, the Court begins the equal-protection analysis by
defining the universe of individuals potentially reached by the particular
governmental power and then looks for improper distinctions within that
universe. The federal government’s power to regulate interstate commerce is
very broad, and the universe of individuals reached by it effectively includes
all persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Congress may not, then, use its
general power to regulate interstate commerce in a manner that singles out
Asian Americans or Roman Catholics for a burden particular to them. It may
not, for example, forbid Asian Americans or Roman Catholics from
purchasing consumer goods in one state and transporting them to another
state. Similarly, a state’s police power is very broad, and the universe of
individuals reached by it effectively includes all persons subject to the state’s
jurisdiction. A state may not, for example, use its police power to impose a

195

For immigration, the Court sometimes locates that power in Congress and the president
(as the political branches of government) and sometimes just in Congress; for Indians and
Indian tribes, the Court usually locates that power only in Congress. But that difference is
inconsequential here.
196
426 U.S. at 79–80.
197
Id. at 84.
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limitation on the number of Asian Americans or Roman Catholics living
within any of the state’s municipalities.
Thus, in reviewing the exercise of a general governmental power
under the equal-protection requirement, the Court’s standard approach
requires that the government legislate even-handedly as to any suspect class.
Non-suspect classifications are permissible and do not trigger the
requirement of even-handedness. For example, Congress, in regulating
interstate commerce, has established a minimum age for the purchase of
products containing nicotine.198 Those individuals falling under the minimum
age are singled out for unfavorable treatment, but the classification is not
suspect for equal-protection purposes. Similarly, state legislatures, in
regulating public health, prohibit unvaccinated children from attending
public schools.199 Again, there is a legal dispreference imposed on a
particular group, but the group is not defined by a suspect classification.
This standard approach to the equal-protection requirement breaks
down when it confronts a governmental power that reaches only a particular
group that is itself defined by a suspect classification. In those cases, the
universe of individuals potentially reached by the governmental power is
necessarily limited to the suspect class.200 This is the problem presented by
the congressional plenary power over aliens and the congressional plenary
power over Indians and Indian tribes. Under more than a century of Supreme
Court case law, it is a hard, constitutional fact that Congress may legislate as
to aliens, Indians, and Indian tribes in ways that it cannot legislate as to
everyone else. But alienage is a suspect classification for equal-protection
purposes; so too is the racial component inherent in Indian descent. It simply
does not work to require that Congress treat aliens and non-aliens even-handedly
when Congress exercises its plenary power over immigration because that
plenary power does not reach beyond aliens.201 Similarly, it does not work to
198

Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 102, 21 U.S.C. § 301.
See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(7) (McKinney 2019) (“No principal, teacher,
owner or person in charge of a school shall permit any child to be admitted to such school . . .
without . . . acceptable evidence of the child’s immunization. . . .”).
200
Cf. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Politics, Indian Law, and the Constitution, 108 CALIF. L. REV.
495, 500 (2020) (“Indian affairs legislation, by definition, creates classifications based on the
racial and ancestral status of Indian people and the tribal membership criteria of Indian tribes.”).
201
A handful of scholars and federal judges have seen this connection between the
congressional plenary power over immigration and the necessity of rational-basis review of
federal classifications involving aliens. Victor C. Romero, noting that “as long as Congress
acts solely within immigration law, affecting only the entry and deportation of noncitizens,
its plenary power ensures that there will be no judicial review of Congressional alienage
classifications on equal protection grounds,” argues that “[t]his result has some appeal: a
sovereignty charged with naturalization powers must make distinctions between citizens and
noncitizens in order to create a coherent immigration policy, and, to this end, Congress must
199
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require that Congress treat Indians and non-Indians even-handedly when
Congress exercises its plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes because
that plenary power does not reach beyond Indians and Indian tribes.
And as the Court has discovered, it is not even workable, for equalprotection purposes, to redefine the universe in those cases to include all
individuals potentially reached by the congressional plenary power and then
to require even-handedness within that universe. The Court maintains, for
example, that the plenary power over immigration includes the power to
make distinctions not just between aliens and non-aliens but also among
different aliens. Thus, the federal statute upheld by the Court in Diaz made
some aliens eligible for Medicare (those who had been admitted for
permanent residency and who had lived in the U.S. for at least five years) and
made all other aliens ineligible for Medicare.202 The same considerations apply
to federal Indian law and justify similar results. In exercising its plenary power
over Indians and Indian tribes, Congress necessarily makes distinctions among
different Indians, different Indian tribes, and the members of different Indian
tribes. Those distinctions run from the most basic issues, such as whether to
recognize a tribe and whether to recognize certain lands as tribal lands, to very
complex issues, such as whether a particular tribe may exercise its retained
treaty rights for off-reservation hunting and fishing.203 Just as there is no
equal-protection requirement to treat all aliens the same, so too there is no
equal-protection requirement to treat all Indians or all Indian tribes the same.
Faced with the immense difficulties inherent in trying to apply its
standard equal-protection approach to the congressional plenary power over
immigration, the Supreme Court has determined that the exercise of that
power is subject only to rational-basis review. Federal immigration
legislation satisfies the equal-protection requirement if the legislation is a
reasonable exercise of the congressional plenary power. The Court has
pursued a slightly different approach for Indians and Indian tribes, holding in
establish alienage classifications in immigration law.” Romero, supra note 193, at 435.
Similarly, Howard F. Chang reasons: “To deny that the federal government has the power to
discriminate against aliens is to cast doubt on the federal power to exclude aliens. Thus, the
Court refuses to apply close scrutiny to discrimination by the federal government against
aliens, especially in the context of immigration policy.” Howard F. Chang, Immigration
Policy, Liberal Principles, and the Republican Tradition, 85 GEO. L.J. 2105, 2112 (1997). A
federal district court judge argued that the equal-protection requirement “simply makes no
sense in [the immigration] context because drawing distinctions between aliens and citizens
is inherent to immigration policy and the conduct of foreign relations.” United States v.
Maru, 479 F. Supp. 519, 522 (D. Alaska 1979).
202
426 U.S. at 82–83.
203
See e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, §§ 3.02–3.03 (discussing the primary federal
definitions of Indian Law, requirements to be recognized as a tribe or member of a tribe, and
application of federal statute based on these distinctions); id. at § 18.03 (outlining the
allocation of hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on reservations).
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Mancari that any “special treatment” of Indians that “can be tied rationally
to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians . . . will
not be disturbed.”204 The better approach would be for the Court to harmonize
its equal-protection analysis of the plenary power over Indians and Indian
tribes with its equal-protection analysis of the plenary power over
immigration. Doing so would put the equal-protection status of federal Indian
law on a more secure foundation.
3. The content of rational-basis review under the plenary-power
approach
To determine that the congressional plenary power over Indians and
Indian tribes requires the application of rational-basis review is, as stated
earlier, to establish a forgiving legal standard. Just as strict scrutiny sets an
almost impossibly high bar for governmental action, rational-basis review
sets a low bar that governmental action rarely fails to clear. 205 And the
specific review appropriate for federal Indian law would uphold the
constitutionality of any federal statute or regulation that represents a
reasonable exercise of the plenary power. This has important implications,
several of which are developed in greater detail in Part II.
A fuller exposition of rational-basis review under the plenary-power
approach requires, at the threshold, a more precise understanding of the
plenary power itself. The case law suggests both a broad reading and a narrow
reading of the power. Under the broad reading, the plenary power enables
Congress to enact almost any legislation concerning Indians and Indian
tribes, subject to the general constitutional limits on congressional power
such as those set out in the Bill of Rights. This broad reading allows federal
legislation without regard to whether the legislation promotes or harms the
interests of Indians and Indian tribes. There is considerable support for the
broad reading in the Supreme Court’s decisions. Among other notorious
examples, the Supreme Court has said that Congress may unilaterally
abrogate a treaty with an Indian nation 206 and that Congress may take
“unrecognized Indian title” to real property without paying just
compensation.207 The broad reading of the congressional plenary power
includes even the power to renounce the government’s obligation to the
Indians and to destroy tribal self-government and tribal sovereignty.
Under the broad reading, federal Indian preferences and federal
Indian dispreferences satisfy the equal-protection requirement. Valid
204

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
Yoshino, supra note 25, at 755–56.
206
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903).
207
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279–82 (1955).
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exercise of the plenary power, on this reading, is not conditioned on favorable
legislative or regulatory outcomes for Indians or Indian tribes. Superficially,
this result appears to be a step back from Mancari because Mancari says that
only laws “tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation
toward the Indians” qualify for rational-basis review.208 But the Court soon
compromised that aspect of Mancari. Antelope and Yakima Indian Nation
applied rational-basis review even to statutes that were disadvantageous both
to individual Indians and to Indian tribes.
Under the narrow reading, by contrast, the plenary power enables
Congress to enact only legislation that protects and promotes the interests of
Indians and Indian tribes. There is support for this reading in case law as well,
although even the Supreme Court seems to have lost sight of it. The
congressional plenary power originated with the federal government’s
extinguishment of tribal independence during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries and with the moral, political, and legal responsibilities that followed
from that extinguishment. When the Supreme Court announced the
congressional plenary power in Kagama, it said that the Indian tribes had
become “the wards of the nation” and “communities dependent on the United
States.”209 Consequently, the Court held, the “power of the General [sc.
federal] Government” over the Indians and the Indian tribes was “necessary
to their protection.”210 At least in general terms, Kagama understood the
congressional plenary power as necessary to promote and to protect the
interests of Indians and Indian tribes. Other plenary-power decisions follow
that reasoning.211
Make no mistake about Kagama. The thinking behind the decision
and the language used to express that thinking reflect an ugly, patronizing
racism that the reader today finds embarrassing and revolting. Kagama is
permeated with stark assumptions about European-American superiority of
208
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the type that Rudyard Kipling later would call “The White Man’s Burden.”
And the decision takes for granted that the Indians of the late nineteenth
century, as “remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in
numbers,” cannot govern or provide for themselves.212 As hateful as all that
is today, Kagama nonetheless suggests that the congressional plenary power
is ultimately a power to legislate only in the interests of Indians and Indian
tribes—for example, by recognizing tribal sovereignty, by facilitating Indian
economic development, and by ensuring the integrity of tribal lands,
religions, and culture. On this reading, Kagama does not give Congress carte
blanche to undermine or destroy the well-being of Indians and Indian tribes—
for example, by abrogating tribal sovereignty, by taking tribal lands without
compensation, or by singling out Indians for unique burdens. What counts as
promoting the interests of Indians and Indian tribes has changed since
Kagama was decided in 1886, but on this reading, it remains true that the
congressional plenary power is a power to help but not to hurt.213
The narrow reading of the congressional plenary power implies that a
federal preference for Indians and Indian tribes generally satisfies the equalprotection requirement but that a federal dispreference for Indians and Indian
tribes may or may not satisfy the equal-protection requirement, depending on
whether the dispreference in fact furthers Indian or tribal interests. The results
of that analysis are not necessarily self-evident. Many Indian dispreferences
cannot be said to further the interests of Indians or Indian tribes, but in some
cases, the analysis will be close enough for reasonable minds to differ.
Protecting tribal sovereignty, for example, may mean upholding actions of
tribal governments that disadvantage individual tribal members.214
On either the broad or the narrow reading of the congressional plenary
power, the rational-basis standard would not apply to many state laws
concerning Indians and Indian tribes. Except for state laws resting on a
delegation of legislative authority from Congress under its plenary power,
state Indian laws generally would be subject to strict scrutiny. This is the
result that should follow as well from Mancari, although some sloppiness by
the lower courts at times has resulted in state laws being reviewed under the
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rational-basis standard.215 Application of strict scrutiny to state laws will have
mixed results for Indians and Indian tribes. Some state laws are unfavorable
to Indians and Indian tribes, and the strict-scrutiny standard will provide an
important means for defeating them. But some state laws are favorable to
Indians and Indian tribes, such as laws recognizing Indian tribes that are not
recognized by the federal government.216 Those laws would remain
vulnerable under a strict-scrutiny standard.
Finally, the plenary-power approach—again, on either the broad or
the narrow reading of the plenary power—does not perpetuate the transparent
falsehood, originating with Mancari, that the distinctions drawn by federal
Indian law are “political rather than racial in nature.” As long as the “political
rather than racial in nature” rationale anchors the equal-protection analysis of
federal Indian law, federal judges with good intentions will pursue the hopeless
exercise of trying to determine whether particular federal laws belong on the
“political” or the “racial” side of the ledger,217 and federal judges with other
intentions will see an opportunity to bring down the whole of federal Indian
law by pointing out that the classifications inevitably incorporate race.
Reformulating rational-basis review as a function of the congressional
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes avoids that problem.
II. APPLYING RATIONAL-BASIS REVIEW TO INDIAN LAW
Using the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes
as the starting point for equal-protection analysis would validate much of
federal Indian law; the results for state laws would be mixed. Federal Indian
preferences would present the easiest cases because, under both the broad and
the narrow readings of the congressional plenary power, the underlying
classifications would be subject to rational-basis review. By contrast, federal
Indian dispreferences would be more likely to draw strict scrutiny under the
narrow reading of the plenary power. To complicate matters, certain federal
Indian laws act as both a preference and a dispreference. For example, the
requirement in Fisher that child-custody matters involving tribal members be
215

See, e.g., Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825, 830 (D.N.M. 1978) (using rational-basis
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litigated in tribal court operated to the advantage of the tribe and to the
disadvantage of the specific member who wanted to litigate in state court.
Similarly, the exclusion of the Kansas Delawares from the zero-sum federal
distribution scheme in Delaware Tribal Business Committee operated to the
disadvantage of the Kansas Delawares and the corresponding advantage of the
Cherokee Delawares and the Absentee Delawares. With those difficulties
in mind, this Part shows how the plenary-power approach would play out
for specific federal and state laws involving Indian classifications, some of
which have been or currently are the targets of equal-protection challenges
in the federal courts.
A. Federal Indian Preferences
A number of federal statutes and regulations confer preferential
treatment on Indians and Indian tribes (or, at least, they are perceived to confer
preferential treatment on Indians and Indian tribes). As long as Mancari
remains good law and as long as the Supreme Court continues to apply
Mancari expansively, these statutes and regulations will satisfy the equalprotection requirement. Similar outcomes follow from the plenary-power
approach, on both the broad and the narrow readings of the plenary power.
Consider first the employment policy at issue in Mancari. In any case
where both an Indian and a non-Indian were under consideration for
promotion within the BIA, the agency gave preference to the Indian. 218 The
policy specifically defined the term “Indian” to include only an individual
who was a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe and who had “onefourth or more degree Indian blood.”219 It thus incorporated Indian descent
twice over: directly, in the requirement of having “one-fourth or more degree
Indian blood” and indirectly, insofar as most (or even all) Indian tribes
require Indian descent as a condition of membership. But whatever
difficulties the Indian-descent component of the employment policy may
present under the standard approach to equal-protection analysis, those
concerns recede under the plenary-power approach. The advancement of
Indians within the BIA represents a reasonable exercise of the congressional
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, which is dispositive in favor of
the constitutionality of the preference.
Next, consider the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, commonly
known as “ICWA.”220 Congress enacted ICWA after determining that state
child-protection agencies routinely removed Indian children from their
families at much higher rates than non-Indian children and that, after
218
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removal, the agencies and the state courts frequently placed Indian children
in foster care or adoption with non-Indian families.221 These practices
presented the obvious and serious concern of undermining Indian familial
and tribal integrity. Consequently, ICWA overrides state child-welfare and
child-custody laws in a several respects. It establishes exclusive tribal-court
jurisdiction over child-welfare and child-custody proceedings involving an
Indian child who is resident or domiciled on the tribe’s reservation, 222 it
provides for concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction over child-welfare and
child-custody proceedings involving any other Indian child, 223 and it gives
the Indian child’s custodian and the tribe a right of intervention in any such
proceedings in state court. 224 Perhaps most controversially, ICWA creates
preferences in adoption proceedings for placement of an Indian child with a
member of the child’s extended family, another member of the child’s tribe,
or another Indian family.225 These preferences modify the traditional statelaw approach to custody determinations. To the extent that a tribal member
who is the biological parent of an Indian child prefers the traditional statelaw approach, ICWA may work to the disadvantage of the tribal member in
that case, even though it generally works to the advantage of tribes. 226
As demonstrated by Brackeen v. Zinke,227 the recent federal district
court decision declaring ICWA unconstitutional, the Mancari approach is
problematic here. ICWA defines the term “Indian child” as an unmarried
individual under the age of eighteen who is “a member of an Indian tribe” or
who is “eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of
a member of an Indian tribe.”228 In the view of some, including the federal judge
who decided Brackeen, the second part of this definition removes the
classification of “Indian child” from the Mancari “political rather than racial in
nature” rationale. After all, the Supreme Court in Mancari determined that a
classification turning on both membership in an Indian tribe and Indian descent
was a purely political classification; but under ICWA, the Brackeen judge said,
the classification turns on either membership in an Indian tribe or on Indian
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descent alone.229 Thus, the judge reasoned, ICWA falls outside Mancari and,
under the strict-scrutiny standard, fails the equal-protection requirement.230
To be sure, there are sound—even compelling—criticisms of the
district court’s technical analysis, and it may well be that the full Fifth Circuit
or the Supreme Court will hold that the requirements of eligibility for tribal
membership and biological descent from a tribal member are sufficient to
bring ICWA within the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale. But
the plenary-power approach avoids that problem entirely. Under the plenarypower approach, the relevant question—the only question—for determining
the correct standard of review is whether ICWA represents a reasonable
exercise of the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes.
The answer is self-evident. Child welfare and child custody are matters of
traditional regulation under the state police power. But the plenary power
confers on Congress a general police power with respect to Indians and Indian
tribes, and ICWA rests on that plenary power. Once again, this is dispositive.
Federal law provides many other preferences for Indians and Indian
tribes—some of them politically controversial but all of them constitutionally
valid when analyzed under the plenary-power approach. The exemption from
state taxation challenged in Moe and the exercise of reserved fishing rights
challenged in Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel both
satisfy the equal-protection requirement under the plenary-power
approach.231 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, commonly known as
“IGRA,”232 generally requires states to enter into agreements with Indian
tribes to allow high-stakes gaming enterprises under tribal ownership.233
IGRA has generated fierce opposition, not least from non-Indian gaming
interests. The Reindeer Industry Act of 1937 generally prohibits private
ownership of reindeer but allows certain Alaska Natives to maintain reindeer
herds,234 a rule that the Ninth Circuit found problematic, even under
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Mancari.235 Similarly, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act generally
prohibits any person from taking, possessing, or transporting bald or golden
eagles, including the feathers of bald or golden eagles, 236 but the statute
includes an exception for “the religious purposes of Indian tribes.”237 And
Congress has enacted numerous programs to provide education, 238 health
care,239 housing,240 and other social services241 to Indians and members of
Indian tribes. For all these federal preferences, the critical question under the
plenary-power approach is whether the underlying statute represents a
reasonable exercise of the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian
tribes. Under that approach, they all satisfy the equal-protection requirement.
B. Federal Indian Dispreferences
Those who incline to think that federal Indian law invariably gives
preferential treatment to Indians and Indian tribes should think hard about
both the past and the present. Through the long history of the Republic,
federal Indian policy has often been brutal and inhumane. The current policy,
in place for the last half century, is one of tribal self-determination, which
encourages and supports the formation and maintenance of institutions for
tribal self-government and the development of tribal economies.242 But
previous policies were far less benign; many were aimed at the eradication of
tribal sovereignty and the destruction of tribal identity and tribal culture.
Beginning with the presidency of James Madison in the early
nineteenth century, the federal government implemented a policy of
removal—the forced migration of eastern tribes to lands west of the
Mississippi River.243 Then, as non-Indian settlement expanded westward, the
federal government changed to a reservation policy, under which Indian
tribes generally were confined to reservations and “groomed for assimilation”
into the non-Indian mainstream.244 In the late nineteenth century, the ground
shifted again when the federal government implemented an allotment policy
under which tribal lands were parceled out to individual Indians and their
families, with “surplus” tribal lands made available for non-Indian
See Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the government’s
interpretation of the Reindeer Industry Act raised a “grave” equal protection question).
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Id. § 1.07; JOHN R. WUNDER, “RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE:” A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
INDIANS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 159–63 (1994).
243
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 1.03.
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settlement, resulting in an astounding decrease in the tribal land base. 245
Congress renounced the allotment policy in the 1930s as part of a broader
federal effort to rebuild tribal institutions and tribal culture. 246 But after the
Second World War, Congress initiated a policy of termination—an
unprecedented effort to eradicate tribal sovereignty, tribal culture, and tribal
institutions by discontinuing the government-to-government relationships
between the U.S. and designated tribes.247 The destructive practices of the
termination era continued until Congress adopted the current policy of selfdetermination in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.
For the last 135 years, the assumed constitutional authority for these
widely varied policies, including those most inimical to Indians and Indian
tribes, has been the congressional plenary power. Consistent with the broad
reading of that power, the thinking has been that nothing requires Congress
to use the power to benefit Indians and Indian tribes; and in any case, even
some of the harsher policies, such as forced assimilation, were thought by
contemporaries to be in the long-term interests of individual Indians
(although not of the tribes). The narrow reading of the power, by contrast,
gives Congress expansive authority over Indians and Indian tribes only to
protect and promote the interests of Indians and Indian tribes. That, in turn,
requires greater discernment about the underlying purposes and effects of
sometimes ambiguous federal legislation.
For example, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 imposes many (but
not all) of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
as constraints on tribal-governmental action.248 The legislation is unfavorable
to Indian tribes. It represents an unwanted federal imposition of limitations
on tribal governments that Congress passed over the objections of the Indian
lobby.249 But the Indian Civil Rights Act is favorable to individual Indians who
are in a position to invoke its protections, such as the rights of free speech and
due process, against tribal governments. On the broad reading of the plenary
power, the favorable and unfavorable implications of the legislation are
irrelevant; the legislation is a reasonable exercise of the congressional plenary
power either way. On the narrow reading, the determination becomes
somewhat closer, although the underlying congressional purpose of
protecting individual Indians’ civil rights should control the result.
Consider other Indian dispreferences. The rule in Fisher requiring a
member of an Indian tribe to litigate a child-custody proceeding in tribal court
was favorable to Indian tribes but unfavorable to any individual Indian who
245
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preferred litigation in state court. The Supreme Court, citing Mancari’s
“political rather than racial in nature” rationale and its “unique obligation”
rationale, rejected the equal-protection challenge to the jurisdictional rule.250
The plenary-power approach produces the same outcome in Fisher on the
narrow reading of the plenary power. The general purpose of exclusive
jurisdiction for the tribal court was the promotion of tribal self-government.
It therefore represents a legitimate—indeed, a paradigmatic—exercise of the
congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, even on the
narrow reading. And the broad reading of course legitimates the rule of
exclusive tribal-court jurisdiction, just as the broad reading legitimates most
or all federal Indian legislation.
The application of the Major Crimes Act to the Indian defendant in
Antelope was plainly disadvantageous. The defendant was convicted of
felony murder even though he could not have been charged with felony
murder if he had been a non-Indian defendant tried under state law. 251
Invoking the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale, the Supreme
Court rejected the defendant’s equal-protection challenge. Under the plenarypower approach, the result is the same under the broad reading of the plenary
power but different under the narrow reading of that power. The general
purpose of the Major Crimes Act was not to protect or to promote the interests
of Indians and Indian tribes, much less of individual Indians. Instead, the
legislation, which Congress passed because of dissatisfaction with how tribal
law addressed crimes committed by Indians against Indians, was part of a
federal scheme to strip Indian tribes of the authority to prosecute and to
punish felonies. On the narrow reading of the congressional plenary power,
then, the Major Crimes Act (at least as applied to the defendant in Antelope)
is not a reasonable exercise of the plenary power and does not shield the
underlying classification from strict scrutiny.
There is an important point to note here. Some advocates of tribal
interests understandably may find it distressing that the plenary-power
approach subjects some federal Indian dispreferences to rational-basis
review. That arguably is a step backwards from Mancari, which purports to
apply rational-basis review only to federal legislation and regulation
furthering the federal government’s “unique obligation toward the
Indians.”252 But in fact, the law has already moved past that point. The
Court’s decisions in Antelope and Yakima Indian Nation ignored the “unique
obligation” rationale when reviewing challenges to federal Indian
dispreferences. More generally, the Court has selectively exploited the
“political rather than racial in nature” rationale and the “unique obligation”
250
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rationale to reject equal-protection challenges to all federal Indian
preferences and dispreferences. The plenary-power approach, on the broad
reading of the power, yields similar outcomes. By contrast, on the narrow
reading of the power, the plenary-power approach at least subjects federal Indian
dispreferences to strict scrutiny when those dispreferences do not protect or
promote the interests of either individual Indians or Indian tribes. This reclaims
some of the ground given up by Antelope and Yakima Indian Nation.253
Finally, the scope of the plenary-power approach should not be
misunderstood. The plenary-power approach does not have unlimited
application. It is specific to the equal-protection requirement, and it does not
insulate federal Indian law from the other provisions of the Bill of Rights.
The plenary-power approach derives from the need to reconcile the equalprotection requirement, which generally forbids drawing legal distinctions
based on a suspect classification, with the congressional plenary power over
Indians and Indian tribes, which generally requires drawing legal distinctions
based on a suspect classification. Other rights provisions in the Constitution
present no such difficulty. Thus, for example, federal takings for public use
generally trigger the Fifth Amendment requirement to pay just compensation,
whether the property taken is Indian or non-Indian.254
C. State Indian Preferences and Dispreferences
At least in theory, the states have limited authority over Indians and
Indian tribes both because the tribes retain inherent sovereignty and because
the Supreme Court treats the congressional plenary power as preempting state
power.255 The Court’s foundational decision in Worcester v. Georgia, which
rejected Georgia’s attempt to regulate the activities of non-Indians on
Cherokee lands, stated firmly that, within Indian country, the “laws of
Georgia can have no force.”256 But state laws nonetheless reach Indians and
Indian tribes in any of several ways. First, state laws of general applicability
cover Indians living, working, or otherwise present outside Indian country.
Second, Congress sometimes delegates federal power over Indians and Indian
253
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tribes to the states. Third, state laws specifically directed at Indians or Indian
tribes sometimes regulate (or attempt to regulate) Indians and Indian tribes
despite the broad preemptive effect of federal authority. The equal-protection
results under the plenary-power approach differ in these different contexts.
Consider first state laws of general applicability that cover Indians
living, working, or otherwise present outside Indian country. An American
Indian, whether or not a member of a recognized tribe, is a citizen of the
United States and a resident of a particular state to the same extent and under
the same terms as a non-Indian. Thus, a member of the Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma who lives and works in Manhattan is both a citizen of the U.S. and
a resident of New York, and she is subject to New York law just as a nonIndian in New York is subject to New York law. Application of the equalprotection requirement is straightforward here. The Equal Protection Clause
applies to New York, just as it applies to every other state, and it overrides
any legislation or regulation of New York or of New York’s counties and
municipalities that violates its terms.
State laws of general applicability are not the product of the
congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, and so they fall
outside the plenary-power approach. Instead, such laws remain subject to the
Supreme Court’s standard approach under the Equal Protection Clause, with
rational-basis review for laws that do not use a suspect classification. For
example, a New York state income-tax statute applying a graduated rate
schedule to all New York taxpayers would not differentiate between the
citizen of the Cherokee Nation living and working in Manhattan and any nonIndian living and working in Manhattan. It would be subject to rational-basis
review, and it would not violate the Equal Protection Clause. But a New York
state income-tax statute applying higher tax rates to New York taxpayers of
the American Indian race would trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause and surely would be unconstitutional—just as would a New
York state income-tax statute applying higher tax rates to Asian Americans
or to Roman Catholics. No special analysis—no departure from the standard
approach to the equal-protection requirement—would be necessary or even
appropriate to reach those results.
Next are state laws applicable to Indians and Indian tribes under a
delegation of federal authority. Although the states generally may not regulate
Indians or Indian tribes for matters within Indian country, Congress sometimes
delegates its regulatory authority to the states. The preeminent example is a
federal statute, known as “Public Law 280,” enacted by Congress in 1953.257
Public Law 280, which has been widely criticized, generally transfers federal
criminal and civil jurisdiction within Indian country to several designated
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states.258 Setting aside specific carve-outs by Congress and retrocessions by the
states, the following sixteen states, sometimes referred to as the “Public Law
280 states,” today have full or partial criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian
country within their borders: Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.259
In exercising this delegated federal power, a Public Law 280 state
may draw distinctions and make classifications involving Indians and Indian
tribes. For example, the Revised Code of Washington, in accepting partial
civil jurisdiction over the Indian reservations within the state, provides that
“[a]ny tribal ordinance or custom . . . adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or
community . . . shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the
state, be given full force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action
. . . .”260 The code also provides for the retrocession to the federal government
of criminal jurisdiction for seven Indian reservations (the Quileute, Chehalis,
Swinomish, Skokomish, Muckleshoot, Tulalip, and Colville Confederated
Tribes reservations) but not for any of the twenty-two other Indian reservations
within the state.261 Under the Supreme Court’s standard approach to the equalprotection requirement, these distinctions and classifications are problematic
because they directly or indirectly incorporate Indian descent.
Using the plenary-power approach, the equal-protection analysis of
state laws enacted under a delegation of the congressional plenary power
follows the equal-protection analysis of federal Indian laws. Thus, if such a
statute or regulation represents a reasonable exercise of the plenary power, it
satisfies the equal-protection requirement. This is effectively the same result
that the Supreme Court has reached under Mancari. In Yakima Indian Nation,
the Court used Mancari to reject an equal-protection challenge brought by
Indian tribes to the State of Washington’s assumption of partial civil and
criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 280. 262
Much more problematic would be state laws involving Indians or
Indian tribes that are not enacted pursuant to a delegation of the congressional
plenary power. Consider, for example, a hypothetical state statute denying
Indians and tribal members licenses for non-treaty fishing. During the 1960s
258
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and the 1970s, attempts by tribal members in the State of Washington to
exercise their treaty-based, off-reservation fishing rights provoked a vicious
backlash among non-Indian fishing interests. The conflict culminated in a
decision by a federal district court judge to enforce the Indians’ right to fish in
what the treaties call the tribes’ “usual and accustomed” fishing places.263 The
district court’s ruling ultimately was upheld by the Supreme Court,264 and
various sub-proceedings in the case continue to the present.265 It is said by
some to be the longest-running civil matter in the history of the federal courts.
Suppose that the State of Washington—which resisted the district
court’s ruling with all the tenacity and ugliness of the southern states in
resisting desegregation during the 1950s and the 1960s 266—had passed a
statute categorically denying commercial and recreational fishing licenses to
any Indian outside the “usual and accustomed” fishing areas covered by the
treaties. That hypothetical statute would have differentiated between Indians
and non-Indians, thereby incorporating the suspect classification of race. And
the hypothetical statute would not have been enacted pursuant to a delegation
of the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes. The
statute, therefore, would have been reviewed under the Supreme Court’s
standard approach to the Equal Protection Clause; it would have triggered
strict scrutiny, and it surely would have been unconstitutional.267
Note that the plenary-power approach would not protect state laws
giving preferential or dispreferential treatment to Indians or Indian tribes
from strict scrutiny under the equal-protection requirement. The lower level
of scrutiny turns precisely on the plenary power over Indians and Indian
tribes, and that power is an attribute of the federal government rather than of
the states. This arguably represents a departure of sorts from the case law
under Mancari. Although a few federal courts have held that the Mancari
framework does not apply to state statutes not enacted under a delegation of
263

United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 333 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d
676 (9th Cir. 1975).
264
Washington v. Wash. State Comm. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
265
See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832, 1832 (2018) (per curiam)
(affirming judgment “by an equally divided court” in on-going sub-proceeding case).
266
Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. United States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th
Cir. 1978) (“Agencies of the State of Washington and various of its constituencies continue
to attack the judgment in United States v. Washington . . . . The state's extraordinary
machinations in resisting the decree have forced the district court to take over a large share
of the management of the state's fishery in order to enforce its decrees. Except for some
desegregation cases . . . the district court has faced the most concerted official and private
efforts to frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century.”).
267
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 14.03 (“Most states at one time or another have
enacted particular laws treating Indians as a distinct class. When these are based simply on
discrimination against Indians unrelated to the distinct status of tribes, they are invalid under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the statutes enforcing them.”).
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the congressional plenary power, 268 some have held otherwise, including the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.269
III. OTHER RESPONSES TO THE EQUAL-PROTECTION CHALLENGE
Scholars writing about federal Indian law have offered a number of
responses to the equal-protection challenge. These range from reiterating and
defending the basic reasoning of Mancari (usually with modifications) to
arguing that the equal-protection requirement categorically does not apply to
classifications involving Indians or Indian tribes. Like the plenary-power
approach, these responses generally defend the constitutionality of federal
Indian law, and like the plenary-power approach, they generally are not
necessary if the Supreme Court respects the Mancari line of cases. In my
view, the plenary-power approach presents the best option for persuading the
Supreme Court to reject the equal-protection challenge to federal Indian law
if the Court does not adhere to Mancari. But there is considerable merit in
many of the other thoughtful approaches developed by Indian law scholars.
The purpose of this part is to situate the plenary-power approach in the
relevant academic literature and in doing so, to note specific points on which
some of the other responses may not be fully persuasive or may not represent
the best approach to defending federal Indian law.
No previous work has considered the full implications of the
congressional plenary power for the equal-protection requirement. But there
have been a few references by Indian law scholars to the equal-protection
deference that the Supreme Court gives to federal immigration law. Philip
Frickey, writing shortly after Adarand, suggests that “in the field of
immigration law and alienage regulation, in which the Court has accorded
Congress a plenary power, the Court will be reluctant to upset longstanding
268

See, e.g., Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 42 F. Supp. 2d 927, 936–42 (D. Alaska 1999)
(invalidating local government employment preference for Alaska Natives); Tafoya v. City
of Albuquerque, 751 F. Supp. 1527, 1529–1531 (D.N.M. 1990) (invalidating city ordinance
allowing only tribal Indians to sell wares within a specified city district).
269
See, e.g., Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214–16 (5th Cir.
1991) (upholding an exemption under Texas law for Native American Church use of peyote
in religious ceremonies). There is a cogent argument that Mancari applies to state-law
classifications involving Indians and Indian tribes. The “political rather than racial in nature”
rationale of Mancari does not depend, as an analytic matter, on what government makes the
classification. If a federal classification involving Indians is “political rather than racial in
nature,” so too is a state classification involving Indians. See, e.g., Williams, Indians as
Peoples, supra note 125, at 865 (1991) (arguing that states should be able to use the “Indian”
classification in the same manner as the federal government). Although the “unique
obligations” rationale does not apply in the case of state laws, the Supreme Court has rejected
equal-protection challenges to federal Indian laws on the basis of the “political rather than
racial in nature” rationale alone, as in Antelope and Yakima Indian Nation.
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arrangements, even though they might arguably involve some discriminatory
element.”270 Frickey then identifies the connection between federal
immigration law and federal Indian law:
Federal Indian law is, of course, also a field in which the Court
has long accorded Congress plenary power. Indeed, in my
judgment, it is far from a coincidence that plenary power exists
in both immigration law and federal Indian law: there are parallel
reasons for plenary power in both. Might this not leave Mancari
good law despite its tension with Adarand? And if judicial
deference remains the norm in federal Indian law, might not the
courts defer to federal policies toward Indians even if . . . they
do not fit within the four corners of Mancari?271
But after drawing the analogy and provocatively asking about its equalprotection implications, Frickey pursues the point no further.
Similarly, an outstanding amicus curiae brief in Brackeen, written by
Sarah Krakoff and Matthew L.M. Fletcher and filed on behalf of more than a
dozen other prominent Indian-law scholars, argues that the Court’s treatment
of the congressional plenary power over immigration policy under the equalprotection requirement justifies corresponding equal-protection deference for
federal Indian law:
The [Supreme] Court’s approach to Congressional
classifications in the Indian law context is similar to other
areas where Congress’s lawmaking authority is broad or
exclusive. In immigration law, Congress has “plenary power
to make rules” for the admission and exclusion of aliens. . . .
Courts reviewing equal protection challenges to immigration
classifications therefore only inquire whether Congress had a
“facially legitimate and bona fide reason.” . . . Similarly,
congressional classifications rooted in the Constitution’s
District and Territories Clauses are subject only to rational
basis review. . . . As these cases reflect, there is nothing
unusual in affording Congress leeway in areas where the
Constitution has delegated broad and exclusive authority to
the legislative branch.272
But as with Frickey’s brief reference to the congressional plenary power over
immigration policy, the amicus curiae brief does not examine the matter
further. That of course is fully appropriate for an argument that a lower

270

Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents, supra note 103, at 1766.
Id.
272
Brief of Indian Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants at 15–16, Brackeen
v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-11479) (internal citations omitted).
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federal court should respect the Supreme Court’s decision in Mancari, but it
leaves the plenary-power approach unexplored and undeveloped.273
A. Responses within the Mancari Framework
Several academic responses aim to justify or to rehabilitate Mancari. In
a characteristically insightful article, Matthew L.M. Fletcher undertakes “to
marry the holding in cases like Morton v. Mancari to the text and structure of the
Constitution.”274 Fletcher says that “[i]t is the settled law of the land that when
Congress legislates to fulfill its trust relationship with Indian tribes, Congress
is entitled to significant deference,”275 a proposition that he calls the “political
classification doctrine.”276 He reasons that, under the Indian Commerce Clause
of Article I.277, the Indians Not Taxed Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,278
and other constitutional provisions,279 Congress “first and foremost as a political
matter decides which persons are Indians, and [Congress] must do so in
deference to tribal membership or citizenship criteria.”280 Similarly, he says,
Congress and the executive branch share constitutional authority for deciding
“which entities constitute ‘Indian tribes.’”281
Fletcher argues that because the Constitution assigns these
determinations to the political branches, “federal (and state) legal
classifications based on tribal membership and citizenship criteria based
purely on Indian blood quantum and ancestry are valid under the
Constitution.”282 More specifically, Fletcher notes that, like the decision
whether to recognize a foreign state, the determination of tribal status has
long been regarded as a political question for justiciability purposes.283 The

In an earlier article, Krakoff, one of the authors of the brief, suggests that “Mancari has .
. . become an extension of Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs . . . .” Krakoff, supra
note 217, at 1059. And with skepticism, David Williams notes that the Supreme Court “could
hold that the equal protection clause is not incorporated against the federal government when
it comes to Indian tribes” so that “Indians would be like aliens: the equal protection clause
[would] involve[] one standard for the central government and another for the states.”
Williams, Indians as Peoples, supra note 125, at 810.
274
Fletcher, supra note 200, at 504.
275
Id. at 500.
276
Id. Although other scholars use the term “political classification doctrine” to refer only to
the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale of Mancari, Fletcher appears to use it to
refer both to that rationale and the “unique obligation” rationale collectively.
277
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
278
U.S. CONST., XIV amend., § 2.
279
Fletcher, supra note 200, at 500, 506.
280
Id. at 504.
281
Id.
282
Id.
283
Id. at 504–05.
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Supreme Court effectively said as much in United States v. Sandoval,284 and
it expressly said so in Baker v. Carr.285 Fletcher argues that the deference
called for by Mancari is analogous to that called for by the political-question
doctrine and that the federal courts should treat determinations about Indian
status, even those made solely by reference to race or ancestry, as all but
dispositive.286 In his view, the only role for the federal courts here is to ensure
that the classifications involving Indians and Indian tribes made by the
political branches are “rationally related to the duty of protection owed by the
United States to Indians and Indian tribes.” 287
Fletcher is one of the leading contemporary thinkers about federal
Indian law, and his effort to put Mancari on a more solid constitutional
foundation deserves close attention from the federal courts. But one may still
examine his argument to see whether any questions arise. Fletcher correctly
maintains that in the first instance, the Constitution allocates the recognition
of Indian tribes and determinations of tribal and Indian status to the legislative
and executive branches. 288 That much is clear, and that much is consistent
with settled law. But the constitutional allocation of a particular function to
Congress or to the president (or to Congress and the president together) does
not necessarily make the exercise of that function unreviewable by the federal
courts, and it does not necessarily imply that the federal courts must review the
exercise of that function under a deferential standard. As John Harrison notes:
“All of Congress’s powers are committed to it by the text [of the Constitution],
yet most exercises of those powers do not give rise to political questions.”289
What, then, is special about determinations of tribal status and Indian
status that entitles those determinations to what Fletcher calls “a very
deferential standard of review from Article III courts”? 290 Determinations
about tribal status are easy; according to the Supreme Court, recognition of
Indian tribes is covered by the political-question doctrine.291 But Fletcher
284

United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215–17 (1962); see John Harrison, The Political Question
Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 461 (2017) (noting that recognition of tribal status is a
political question). As with certain other political questions, the deference of the federal
courts on determinations of tribal status is not absolute; as the Court noted in Baker v. Carr (citing
Sandoval), a determination of tribal status must involve a group that is “distinctly Indian,” and
“the courts will strike down any heedless extension of that label.” 369 U.S. at 216–17.
286
Fletcher, supra note 200, at 519.
287
Id. at 505.
288
Id. at 504.
289
Harrison, supra note 285, at 500.
290
Fletcher, supra note 200, at 504.
291
For some reason, Fletcher pulls his punch here. He argues that “[t]he federal government’s
decision to acknowledge Indian tribes as sovereigns to which the United States owes a duty
of protection is akin to a nonjusticiable political question.” Id. at 522 (emphasis added). But
under Sandoval and Baker, a determination of tribal status is actually a political question.
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215–17 (1962).
285
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aims more broadly. He rejects what he calls the “compromise position,”
which concedes deferential review for classifications involving Indian tribes
but not for classifications involving Indians.292 The compromise position, he
says, animated the district court’s decision in Brackeen, holding that ICWA
is unconstitutional because the statute’s definition of “Indian child” reaches
beyond enrolled tribal members.293 For Fletcher, there must also be a basis
for deference to classifications involving individual Indians.
Fletcher makes two arguments in support of this point. First is an
argument from the text and the structure of the Constitution:
The Constitution denies Article III courts the power to review
decisions made by Congress and the executive branch
recognizing . . . Indian tribes. I argue the Constitution also
denies Article III courts the full power to review decisions
made by Congress and the executive branch recognizing and
classifying individual Indians. The relevant Constitutional
texts are the Indians Not Taxed Clause and the [Indian]
Commerce Clause. The structural argument rests with the fact
that the Constitution leaves the concurrent powers to define
“Indians not taxed” and “Indian tribes” to the federal and state
political branches.294
That is, “[t]he Constitution authorizes and requires the federal government to
define who is Indian.”295 Again, this is simply the argument that, because the
Constitution allocates a particular function to one (or both) of the political
branches, the courts must stand down; again, that argument is problematic.
Article I allocates the legislative power of the United States to Congress, but
the courts do not—and cannot, consistent with Marbury v. Madison296—give
general deference to Congress in its legislative determinations. Similarly,
Article II allocates the executive power of the United States to the president,
but the courts do not give general deference to the executive branch. As
Harrison says, most exercises of congressional Article I powers “do not give
rise to political questions.”297 The same is true of most exercises of
presidential Article II powers. Calling a determination of Indian status a
“political choice”298 does not rescue the position. Almost every decision
292

Fletcher, supra note 200, at 502–04.
Id. at 502–03. For an example of the “compromise position” in the academic literature,
see Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1335, 1359 (1997) (arguing that “classifications based on Indian-tribe membership” are
not “based on race” but that “[c]lassifications based only on being an Indian” are “racial”).
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Fletcher, supra note 200, at 520.
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Id.
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5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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Harrison, supra note 285, at 500.
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made by Congress or the president is a political choice; they are, after all, the
political branches. A political choice is distinct from a political question.
Second, Fletcher argues that the meaning of the term “Indian” is
“inherently and necessarily political.” 299 This is a normative argument.
Fletcher says that the deference provided to determinations about tribal status
under the political-question doctrine “must” apply also to determinations
about Indian status and that such determinations “should” be reviewed under
the rational-basis standard.300 He supports the position by analogizing Indians
to foreigners, by invoking the wide latitude of Congress to define the scope
of the federal government’s duty of protection to Indians and Indian tribes,
by suggesting a parallel between determinations of Indian status and tribal
status, and by questioning the institutional capacity of the judiciary to make
decisions about Indian status.301
Again, Fletcher offers a deeply intriguing defense of federal Indian
law against the equal-protection challenge. That said, three specific concerns,
which arise under both his textual-structural argument and his normative
argument, merit consideration. First, to say that a determination about tribal
status or Indian status is a political classification is not necessarily to say that
such a determination is not also a racial classification. Fletcher assumes a
sharp dichotomy on this point. He reasons: “The text of the Constitution itself
demands that Congress determine who is an ‘Indian’ for the purposes of
regulating commerce and apportionment. Classifications of Indian status,
thus, are not impermissible race-based classifications but rather
constitutionally mandated political determinations.” 302 This is similar to the
move that the Supreme Court made in Mancari with the “political rather than
racial in nature” rationale.
But the underlying “either-or” assumption has not been justified. A
status determination can be both political and racial, just as it can be both
political and religious—in the case, for example, of a legislative
determination to define who qualifies as a Christian and then to treat all
Christians favorably or unfavorably under federal law. Fletcher labors
mightily (and in my view successfully) to demonstrate that determinations
about Indian status are essentially political, both because those
determinations are made by the political branches and because they have
political attributes and political implications.303 But that does not mean that
those determinations are not also racial. That, after all, is the fundamental
and longstanding objection to the Mancari “political rather than racial in
nature” rationale.
299
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Second, judicial deference to a legislative or administrative
determination about tribal status or Indian status is only judicial deference to
the determination about status. It is not deference to the entire legislative or
administrative project in which the status determination is situated, and it
does not deprive the federal courts of Article III jurisdiction over any case or
controversy that may involve or even turn on resolution of the political
question. Even under the strongest form of the political-question doctrine,
only the political question itself is non-justiciable; other legal questions that
depend on the outcome of the political question remain fully justiciable. The
answer provided by Congress or the president to a political question becomes
a “datum” that the courts treat as conclusive, but the courts still adjudicate
any claim incorporating that datum. 304 As Harrison writes: “Because of the
political question doctrine, the decision of a non-judicial actor can provide a
premise that the court uses in a decision on the merits.”305
To put the point in terms of the Brackeen decision about the
constitutionality of ICWA, even complete deference by the federal courts to
the congressional decision about who is an “Indian” and who is an “Indian
child” only reaches the question of who is an “Indian” and who is an “Indian
child.” That deference precludes the courts from reviewing where Congress
chose to draw lines in defining “Indian” and “Indian child.” But the deference
would not make the ICWA equal-protection issue non-justiciable. Even
accepting without question or review the congressional definitions of
“Indian” and “Indian child,” the federal courts would still have to determine
whether the use of those definitions in the statute satisfy the equal-protection
requirement. The two points are distinct, and only the former would be
covered by political-question deference.
Third, the Supreme Court itself has indicated that, although
determinations of tribal status are political questions, determinations about
Indian status are squarely within the competency of the federal courts to
review and to adjudicate. Baker v. Carr, citing and quoting Sandoval, said
that the “Court’s deference to the political departments in determining
whether Indians are recognized as a tribe” is subject to the limitation that
304

Harrison, supra note 285, at 485–87. In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court illustrated this
point by reference to Worcester v. Georgia, one of the foundational cases in federal Indian
law. The Court said that, in Worcester, “the fact that the tribe was a separate polity served as a
datum contributing to the result, and despite the consequences in a heated federal-state
controversy and the opposition of the other branches of the National Government, the judicial
power acted to reverse the State Supreme Court.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215 n.43 (1962).
305
Harrison, supra note 285, at 487; see also id. at 496 (“Justiciability is distinct from subject
matter jurisdiction in that a court can have jurisdiction to decide a case that turns on
nonjusticiability, and indeed a court can award relief in a case in which an issue is
nonjusticiable. When a plaintiff with a meritorious claim relies on the political branches’
recognition of a foreign government, for example, the political question doctrine underlies
part of the court’s reasoning in a successful suit.”).
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Congress may not “‘bring a community or body of people within the range
of [the congressional plenary] power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian
tribe.’”306 And then the Court drove the point home that the federal courts do
not defer to the political branches on Indian status: “Able to discern what is
‘distinctly Indian,’ . . . the courts will strike down any heedless extension of
that label.”307 There is good reason for this differential treatment of
determinations of tribal status and determinations of Indian status. Unlike
determinations of tribal status, determinations of Indian status do not involve
“questions of sovereignty and relations among sovereigns”—one of the limited
categories in which the political-question doctrine “attribute[s] finality to
political actors’ application of law to fact.” 308 Thus, the step from politicalquestion deference for determinations of tribal status to political-question
deference for determinations of Indian status is neither short nor simple.309

306

369 U.S. at 215–16 (quoting United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913)).
Id. at 216–17 (quoting United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913)).
308
Harrison, supra note 285, at 460. The other two categories are cases that involve “the process
of legal enactment” and cases for which “the Constitution explicitly designates a house of
Congress as judge, either of its own members’ elections or of impeachments in the Senate.” Id.
309
In setting up his argument, Fletcher praises a recent article by Gregory Ablavsky as a
“game-changer” in the application of the equal-protection requirement to federal Indian law.
Fletcher, supra note 200, at 503. Ablavsky’s article attempts to recover the historical
meanings of the words “tribe” and “Indian” as used in the Indian Commerce Clause and the
(original) Indians Not Taxed Clause. See generally Ablavsky, supra note 165. Ablavsky
finds that “Anglo-Americans of the late eighteenth century” used “Indian” both as a political
classification and as a racial classification. Id. at 1068–69. He argues that, to the extent the
use of the word “Indian” in the Constitution is understood in racial terms, the notion of a
“colorblind Constitution” is compromised: “[I]f we abandon the legal fiction that ‘Indian’ is
a political classification, we must also give up the larger fiction of a colorblind Constitution.
Under this interpretation, race is literally written into the text of our Constitution.” Id. at
1073. From this, Ablavsky concludes that the equal-protection challenge to federal Indian
law must fail: “It is very hard to argue that a classification is unconstitutional when it is
mandated by the Constitution itself. This reading strongly suggests that with respect to those
people labeled ‘Indians,’ the Constitution itself authorizes distinctions based on ancestry.”
Id. at 1074. This reasoning is perhaps not as tight as one might wish. That the text of the
Constitution incorporates a distinguishing characteristic of individuals or a group of
individuals does not mean that any legislation classifying individuals or a group of
individuals on the basis of that characteristic is exempt from the equal-protection
requirement. The Nineteenth Amendment, for example, prohibits the denial of voting rights
“on account of sex,” but Congress does not have a general license to draw distinctions on the
basis of sex without regard to the equal-protection requirement. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. It
does, however, mean that legislation enacted under a grant of constitutional power for which
the Constitution uses that characteristic to define the scope of the power must be reconciled
with the equal-protection requirement. This is true of the congressional plenary power over
immigration, the exercise of which necessarily involves classifications on the basis of
alienage, and it is true of the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, the
exercise of which involves classifications on the basis of race.
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Bethany Berger offers a nuanced and innovative equal-protection
argument that, like Fletcher’s argument, attempts to justify Mancari. Berger
maintains that the core of federal Indian law defines the terms of a sovereignto-sovereign relationship between the federal government and the recognized
Indian tribes “rather than the relationship of sovereigns to disadvantaged
individuals that characterizes equal protection claims.”310 She argues that “an
antidiscrimination norm lies at the heart of equal protection” and that laws
restoring and furthering tribal sovereignty “are consistent with” the general
equal-protection objective “of undermining state-sanctioned racial
discrimination.”311 In other words, Berger says, “federal Indian policies are
normatively consistent with equal protection.” 312
Berger maintains that the “political rather than racial in nature”
rationale of Mancari does not “posit[] a counterfactual nonracial status for
Indian people” but instead “demonstrat[es] the ways the classification
fulfilled the goals emerging from the unique federal relationship” with
Indians and Indian tribes. 313 Generalizing this point, Berger argues that
legislation advancing the interests of tribal sovereignty “is consistent with the
spirit of equal protection because it partially reverses discrimination against
tribal governments by restoring a measure of their territorial sovereignty.” 314
And so, despite misgivings about what she sees as the Supreme Court’s
failure “[to] build on [the] potential” of Mancari,315 Berger argues that Indian
preferences—laws that “respond to and partially undo the denial of equal
political rights founded in racialized images of native peoples”—“further the
goals of equal protection” and should be considered constitutional. 316
Berger’s argument is an heroic effort to meet the equal-protection
challenge, but it necessarily marginalizes many of the cases that ground the
challenge. Berger reads the Equal Protection Clause as proscribing only
governmental discrimination that harms historically disadvantaged groups,
such as African Americans, but as permitting governmental discrimination
that benefits such historically disadvantaged groups. 317 Of course, if current
equal-protection doctrine conformed to that reading of the Equal Protection
Clause, there would be no equal-protection challenge to federal Indian law in
the first place—nor, for that matter, would there be any equal-protection
challenge to governmental affirmative action. Berger acknowledges that her
starting point, although shared by many other scholars and commentators,
310
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remains highly contested and that her reading of the Equal Protection Clause
has found little traction “in other areas.” 318 Nonetheless, she argues that the
antidiscrimination norm is what informs the Mancari “political rather than
racial in nature” rationale.319 She maintains that the Court used the “political
rather than racial in nature” rationale to uphold the BIA employment
preference in Mancari precisely because the preference was benign with
respect to Indian tribes—that is, because it promoted tribal sovereignty. 320
Again, it is an intriguing argument, and it may be normatively right.
But it holds limited promise as a strategy for defending federal Indian law in
the federal courts. The argument effectively dismisses Bakke and Adarand,
which raise serious doctrinal concerns about affirmative-action programs;321
it effectively dismisses Antelope, which applies the “political rather than
racial in nature” rationale equally to legislation favoring Indians and
legislation disfavoring Indians; and it effectively dismisses the concerns
raised by the federal judges who have expressed sympathy for the equalprotection challenge. Ultimately, Berger is making the case to those who
already share a particular anti-subordination understanding of the equalprotection requirement. But the argument likely will have little effect on
those, such as Chief Justice Roberts, who read the Equal Protection Clause
as mandating a color-blind approach—who maintain that “[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race.”322 In short, Berger does not really meet the equal-protection challenge
to federal Indian law on its own terms. Instead, she maintains that the entire
analytic critique of affirmative action and other legislation benefitting
historically disadvantaged groups has misunderstood the Equal Protection
Clause. Again, the argument might be normatively right, but its prospects for
success as a litigation strategy are open to question.
Addie Rolnick challenges the Mancari “political rather than racial in
nature” rationale, although her general purpose is to argue against the
conceptual deficiencies of the rationale itself rather than the outcomes that it
produces.323 Rolnick rejects the “oppositional framing” of Mancari—the
political-racial dichotomy; she argues that the term “Indian” denotes “both a
318

Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1183–88.
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In fact, the constitutional difficulties with affirmative action run even to affirmative action
that is “race-neutral” on the surface. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications
of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2333 (2000) (arguing that raceneutral efforts to increase minority representation in higher education may constitute “raceconscious state action that may violate the Equal Protection Clause”).
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Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
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See generally Rolnick, supra note 217 (exploring “the legal roots of the political
classification doctrine, its ongoing significance, and the descriptive limits and normative
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racial category and the unique political history of Indian tribes.” 324 She says
that Mancari, although wrong in suggesting a clean distinction between
Indian status as a political classification and Indian status as a racial
classification, remains useful in protecting federal Indian law from the equalprotection challenge. 325 Still, she says, the “legal ideology” exemplified by
Mancari conceals “the relationship between Indian racialization and tribal
political status,” and it frustrates understanding of “the anti-racist potential of
federal Indian law in light of Indian racial subordination.” 326
Rolnick aims less to justify Mancari than to push beyond it. She
argues that the “problems” confronting Indians and Indian tribes cannot “be
adequately addressed without attention to both the racial and the political
elements . . . and the mutually constitutive relationship between them.”327 She
prefers not to treat federal Indian law as “separate from and antithetical to
issues of race” but instead to “engage[] the impact of both racialization and
political rights.”328 Rolnick argues for a “conceptual reframing” of both
elements of the Mancari framework—both the “political” and the “racial”—
to yield a “less restrictive interpretation” of Indian law. 329 She develops this
framework in two moves. First, she argues that contemporary hostility toward
Indians and Indian tribes implicates “racialized ideas about Indians” and
works to deny the exercise of specifically Indian political rights (such as tribal
sovereignty and reserved hunting and fishing rights).330 Second, she argues
that the protection of Indian political rights becomes “an important tool of
anti-racism.”331 But her goal, she insists, is “doctrinally modest”—simply to
provide greater context for the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale
so that courts might avoid narrow applications of Mancari.332
Finally, Carole Goldberg describes an argument in defense of Indian
law that takes the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale seriously.333
She presents the argument with some hesitation; she never fully endorses it,
and, in fact, she astutely identifies many of its shortcomings. Goldberg
characterizes the argument as maintaining that “Indian classifications are
political, not racial, so long as they turn on tribal citizenship rather than
ancestry” and that “Indian classifications are no different from permissible
324
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classifications based on U.S. or foreign citizenship and should be tested by
the same relaxed equal protection standard.” 334 Goldberg finds “much to
commend” here but points out that the “political rather than racial in nature”
rationale “encounters some difficulties,” 335 including the chronically
troubling point that tribal-membership criteria ordinarily require Indian
ancestry.336 Goldberg argues that “[f]ormal, inflexible ancestry requirements
. . . are not part of the historic practice of tribes” but instead were introduced
into tribal laws and customs under pressure from the federal government,
“which was concerned with restricting eligibility for federal benefits and
special Indian status.”337 For that reason, she argues, “classifications that turn
on tribal citizenship could be characterized as race or ancestry plus
classifications, which would return us to the challenges from anti-affirmative
action forces.”338 Goldberg also notes that linking a relaxed standard of
review to membership in a recognized Indian tribe provides no equalprotection relief for federal laws concerning non-tribal Indians or conferring
initial recognition on an Indian tribe. 339
B. Responses Rejecting the Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment
Another group of responses argues that the Fourteenth Amendment
generally and the Equal Protection Clause specifically do not apply to laws
covering Indian tribes or their members. Although scholars have presented
this argument in several different versions, the basic idea is reasonably
straightforward. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, according to this
argument, considered Indian tribes and tribal members to be separate from
the general citizenry of the United States and of the individual states.
Although the Equal Protection Clause has always applied to the states (and at
least since Bolling v. Sharpe in 1954, to the federal government as well),
many Indian tribes still inhabited lands outside the borders of the states at the
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exclusively racial classifications of Indians should fall outside the Mancari framework and
that laws involving classifications of Indian tribes should be treated as discriminatory
whenever those laws adversely affect tribes); Johnson & Crystal, supra note 42 (arguing for
modification to the Mancari framework by requiring stricter scrutiny of laws not advancing
the federal government’s trust responsibility to Indians and Indian tribes).
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time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868.340 Also, many tribal
Indians, whether or not living within an existing state, were not U.S. citizens
in 1868—a point recognized obliquely in the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment. And so, the argument runs, the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment never intended the Equal Protection Clause to cover Indian
tribes or tribal members—not directly, as a constraint on state governments,
and not indirectly, as a constraint on the federal government.
David Williams provides an early and clear articulation of this
position. Williams argues that the Equal Protection Clause “does not run to
Indians under tribal relations because the clause itself considers them to be a
separate people.”341 The critical point, in his view, is tribal sovereignty. To
the extent that the federal government respects tribal sovereignty, the Equal
Protection Clause does not apply to laws concerning Indian tribes and tribal
members; to the extent that the federal government overrides tribal
sovereignty, “the strict standards of the equal protection clause should come
to control government actions.”342 Williams argues that even if the
government “may not use racial classifications” in those places where “the
writ of the equal protection clause runs,” the “writ has never been extended
to Indian Country.”343 In his view, “[t]he domestic morality of the clause has
no more applicability to Indian reservations than it does to Sweden or
Nicaragua, because all of that territory is still under the governance of
different cultural concepts and has never been fully and permanently invaded
by American ideological imperialism.”344
This argument is not primarily normative; Williams finds support for
his conclusions in both the text and the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The text treats tribal Indians as separate from non-tribal Indians and nonIndians. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in determining the
apportionment of representatives among the states, excludes “Indians not
taxed.”345 And section 1, in confirming U.S. citizenship for “[a]ll persons
born or naturalized in the United States,” specifically requires that such
persons be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States—a provision,
Williams argues, that was meant to exclude tribal Indians. 346 Williams
maintains that the “two phrases—‘Indians not taxed’ and Indians ‘not subject
to the jurisdiction’ of the United States—turn out to have identical
340
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meanings.”347 In the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, he says,
members of Congress wanted to distinguish between “two vaguely imagined
categories of Indians—‘wild’ Indians and ‘domesticated’ ones.” 348 The
language settled on to make the distinction—roughly but imperfectly
corresponding to a distinction between tribal and non-tribal Indians—was
that the former were “not taxed.” 349 Later, in debating the language for
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Williams says, members of
Congress used the term “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States as
the equivalent of excluding “Indians not taxed.” 350
Thus, Williams argues, the framers specifically intended to exclude
tribal Indians from the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. 351 They did so
using somewhat indirect and imprecise language about taxation and
jurisdiction, but their objective, as expressed in debates over the language of
the amendment, is clear. Even if tribal Indians were subject to the overriding
sovereignty of the United States, they also were subject to the sovereignty of
their tribes. For that reason, tribal Indians constituted “a separate people” who
were not fully subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and who were
therefore outside the Fourteenth Amendment. 352 “And,” Williams argues,
“that status did not change even if the federal government had asserted some
jurisdiction over them, as long as it had not destroyed their tribal
government.”353 The rule that Williams distills from the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, then, is that the Equal Protection Clause does not
apply to any “Indian-specific legislation” that is “consistent with” the
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“peoplehood” of Indians.354 He maintains that this exempts from heightened
equal-protection scrutiny any legislation that promotes tribal sovereignty and
tribal self-determination as well as any legislation that does not “positively
contradict” tribal sovereignty or tribal self-determination.355 By contrast, it
does not permit legislation that singles Indians out for treatment as racially
inferior to non-Indians. Legislation of that nature, Williams maintains, must
be reviewed under the strict-scrutiny standard.356
The argument is interesting and, as to the status quo in 1868, possibly
compelling. But the equal-protection challenge to federal Indian law is not
about the state of affairs in 1868; it is about the state of affairs today, and
much has changed since the Reconstruction Period. Every recognized Indian
tribe is now located within the boundaries of one of the states; Congress
extended U.S. citizenship to (or, depending on one’s view, imposed U.S.
citizenship on) all Indians in 1924; 357 and the Supreme Court definitively
confirmed in 1954 that the equal-protection requirement applies not only to
state government but also to the federal government. Williams argues that
354
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general power granted in the Naturalization Clause.” Beck, at 50 (emphasis added). This last
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cannot confer citizenship that has not been conferred by the citizenship clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Beck in effect reads the proviso in the citizenship clause—“and
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acquiring U.S. citizenship through any means other than a later constitutional amendment.
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Congress understood the reference to “Indians not taxed” in section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to be the equivalent of excluding persons not
“subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States from citizenship under
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.358 But even if that was correct in
1868, there are no longer any people who meet that description. All American
Indians, whether tribal members or not and whether living within or without
Indian country, are subject to taxation by the federal government, and all
American Indians, whether tribal members or not and whether living within
or without Indian country, are subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.359 Williams’ argument is good so far as it goes, but somewhere
between 1868 and the present, it encounters very serious difficulties.360
Ultimately, the argument works as a response to the equal-protection
challenge only if one assumes that the Fourteenth Amendment lays down a
rule that Indian tribes and their members, because they were not citizens and
were not subject to taxation in 1868, would never be covered by the Equal
Protection Clause—regardless of whether Indians later became citizens,
regardless of whether Indians later became subject to taxation, regardless of
whether tribal lands later became geographically incorporated into existing
and future states, and regardless of whether the federal government itself later
became subject to the equal-protection requirement. Williams adduces strong
evidence about what Congress intended for 1868 but no evidence at all about
what Congress intended for the century and a half that followed. 361
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C. Responses under the Indian Commerce Clause
Finally, there have been scholarly responses to the equal-protection
challenge that, although distinct from the plenary-power approach set forth
in this paper, draw on the Indian Commerce Clause. Carole Goldberg, for
example, argues that “the equal protection requirements of the Constitution
have only limited application to federal Indian legislation, because the Indian
Commerce Clause of the Constitution specifically authorizes the exercise of
federal power with respect to tribes in particular.” 362 Goldberg observes that
the Indian Commerce Clause “envisions measures addressed specifically to
Indian nations” but that the “equal protection provisions of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments dictate equal treatment in very general terms.” 363
This, she says, implicates the interpretive canon that “more specific
provisions should control over more general provisions” and forces the
conclusion that “the language of the Indian Commerce Clause should allow
federal legislation directed at Indian tribes without triggering the strictest
form of scrutiny under Fifth Amendment equal protection.” 364
This argument is open to question. Section 8 of Article I of the
Constitution confers a number of specific powers on Congress in addition to
the plenary power that the Court has located in the Indian Commerce Clause.
It cannot be that because these powers are framed in specific terms, they are
exempt from the Equal Protection Clause, which is framed in general terms.
Consider the very first congressional power mentioned in Section 8—the
“Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”365 The
Taxing Clause is at least as specific as the Indian Commerce Clause. Under
Goldberg’s reasoning, the equal-protection requirement would “have only
limited application to federal [tax] legislation, because the [Taxing] Clause
of the Constitution specifically authorizes the exercise of federal power with
respect to [taxation] in particular.” If Goldberg’s argument were correct,
Congress would be free to impose higher rates of taxation on Asian
Americans or Roman Catholics, for example, than on persons who fall
outside either of those suspect classifications.
Similarly, Section 8 of Article I grants Congress the power “[t]o
provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of
362

Goldberg, supra note 75, at 966. See also Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 125, at 172
(arguing that “[b]ecause [A]rticle I of the Constitution specifically authorizes Congress to
determine federal policy towards Indian tribes, strict scrutiny analysis [of equal protection]
is simply irrelevant”).
363
Goldberg, supra note 75, at 967.
364
Id.; cf. Clinton, supra note 75, at 1015 (“The mere existence of the Indian [C]ommerce
[C]lause suggests that special legislation for the nation’s indigenous peoples is
constitutionally justified even if it involves racial classification.”).
365
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.

Vol. 6:1]

Equal Protection Challenge to Federal Indian Law

73

the United States”366—again, on Goldberg’s argument, opening the path for
Congress to prescribe harsher criminal penalties for counterfeiters who are
Asian American or Roman Catholic than for other counterfeiters. And on the
analysis would run—through all the other specific powers conferred on
Congress by the Constitution, from the Interstate Commerce Clause through
the clause granting Congress the exclusive power to legislate for the District of
Columbia. Goldberg’s argument that the specific language of the Indian
Commerce Clause in Article I trumps the general language of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment effectively makes most (perhaps all) federal legislation on
any subject immune from strict scrutiny under the equal-protection requirement.
In attempting to save federal Indian law from the equal-protection challenge,
Goldberg’s position would effectively overrule Bolling v. Sharpe.
Additionally, Goldberg’s argument would generally deny Indians and
Indian tribes the protections against federal power provided by the Bill of
Rights. Goldberg reads the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I as “specific”
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as “general,” and she
maintains that the specific must trump the general.367 But other provisions in
the Bill of Rights are also general, such as the First Amendment’s guarantee of
“freedom of speech,” the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of
“just compensation” for takings, and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against “cruel and unusual punishments.” On Goldberg’s reasoning, those
“general” constitutional rights would not constrain the federal government in
its exercise of the “specific” power granted by the Indian Commerce Clause—
with the effect that Congress, when legislating as to Indians and Indian tribes,
could deny free speech, provide for arbitrary searches and seizures, take
property without compensation, and impose cruel and unusual punishments.
And even if there might be reasonable disagreements about whether
one or more of the provisions in the Bills of Rights are not so general as to
give way to the Indian Commerce Clause, remember that Goldberg’s
argument turns on her claim that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment must give way to the Indian Commerce Clause. But the Due
Process Clause is what ensures that the federal government cannot deprive
any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 368 Does
anyone really want to maintain that, in exercising its plenary power over
Indians and Indian tribes, Congress can deprive Indians of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law?
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CONCLUSION
Certain problems presented by contemporary federal Indian law defy
straightforward resolution, but the equal-protection challenge does not.
Established Supreme Court case law points to the congressional plenary
power over Indians and Indian tribes as the critical determinant of how the
Equal Protection Clause should be applied to Indians and Indian tribes. Just
as with the congressional plenary power over immigration, the congressional
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes precludes use of the strictscrutiny standard and compels use of a rational-basis standard of review. It is
rank nonsense to insist, as the Court has maintained since the nineteenth
century, that Congress has plenary and exclusive power over Indians and
Indian tribes but then to treat the distinctions drawn by Congress between
Indians and non-Indians as suspect classifications. The Supreme Court avoids
that result in matters involving aliens and naturalized citizens; it should avoid
that result in the parallel matters involving Indians or Indian tribes. Properly
analyzed, the equal-protection challenge presents no legitimate threat to
federal Indian law.

